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Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and
Managerial Myopia
Emeka DuruigboI
INTRODUCTION
S HORT-TERMISM denotes the phenomenon by which some corporate
managers, responding to pressure from investors or acting to bolster their
own position, advert their attention and exert their energies to achieving
short-term profitability, virtually eschewing longer-term considerations.'
It is important to emphasize at the outset that short-termism is not
coterminous with holding stocks for short periods by investors. Short-
termism refers to the investment approach in which investors "push
managers to invest in short-term projects in order to keep earnings high.
In this sense, investors who behave in a short-termistic manner may well
have long holding periods, provided managers satisfy the investors' need
for high earnings period by period."3 Short-termism promotes a tendency
to overvalue short-term rewards, invariably leading to an undervaluation
of long term consequences. 4 Indeed, some market observers and legal
commentators link the collapse, a few years ago, of giant energy company
Enron and some fabled financial firms to investors acting like traders
and influencing corporate managers to make policy decisions based on
quarterly earnings statements. 5 One analyst dissects the malaise in this
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2 AUSTL. Gov'T CORPS. & MKT. ADvISORY COMM., THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPO-
RATIONS REPORT 21 (2006).
3 Oyvind Bohren, Richard Priestley & Bernt Arne 0degaard, Investor Short-Termism
and Firm Value 1 n.I (Aug. 28, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://finance.
bi.no/-bernt/wps/ovnershipduration/durationaug_2oo9.pdf.
4 See Kevin J. Laverty, Managerial Myopia or Systemic Short-termism?: The Importance of
Managerial Systems in ValuingtheLong Term, 42 MGMT. DECISION 949,950 (2004) (discussing the
phenomenon of organizations overvaluing short-term rewards and undervaluing long-term
consequences).
5 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Pri-
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manner: "Financial analysts fixate on quarterly earnings at the expense of
fundamental research. Corporate executives, in turn, point to the behavior
of the investment community to rationalize their own obsession with
earnings. 'Short-termism' is the disease; earnings and tracking error are the
carriers. 
'6
The issue of short-termism has acquired sufficient currency that it
has become easy, if not convenient, to attribute a host of corporate actions
to the dominance of short-term thinking. One of the alleged culprits in
the 2010 Gulf Oil tragedy7 is short-termism s In linking the calamity to
short-termism and stock trading, one commentator states that the current
system of organizing and managing public companies, with its focus on
quarterly earnings and shareholder primacy orchestrated the problem.9 The
macy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 673 (zoo6) (discussing the role of short-termism in the collapse of fa-
bled energy giant, Enron); Leo E. Strine, Jr., TowardA True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, i 19 HAsv. L. REV. 1759, 1772-73
(2006) (explaining the short-term approach to investment); William W. Bratton, Enron andthe
Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1283 (zooz) (explaining the collapse of
Enron in terms of risk-prone policy, short-term decision-making).
6 Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, 61 FiN. ANA-
LYSTS J. 65, 6S (zoo5); Martin Lipton, Theodore N. Mirvis & Jay W. Lorsch, The Proposed
"Shareholder Bill of Rights of 2oo9 ", THE HARv. L. SCH. F ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(May 12, 2009, 4:56 PM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2oo9/o5/I2/the-proposed-
%EZ%8o%9Cshareholder-bill-of-rights-act-of-oo9%E2%8o%9D/ (stating that "[sihort-
termism is a disease that infects American business and distorts management and boardroom
judgment" although its origin can be traced outside the boardroom to "the trading rooms of
the hedge funds and professional institutional investment managers who control more than
75% of the shares of most major companies").
7 The Deep Horizon disaster of April 20I0 claimed the lives of eleven oil platform workers
and virtually engulfed the United States operations of international energy giant, BP Pic.
The tragedy perhaps inexorably altered the health, lives, livelihoods, and culture of millions
of people, plants, and animals in several states. See Adam Thomson, Gulf Fishermen Put BP on
the Hook for Losses, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 12, 20o0, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/76563o48-a656-
ii df-8; Enjoli Francis, Diverse Community of the Bayou Laments Life After Oil Leak, ABC WORLD
NEws, July 13, ZOlo, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/world-news-diane-sawyer-heads-bayou-
cajun-territory/story?id= 1I53282&page=i.
8 Tim Lynch, Two Spills Can Teach Us Lessons, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, July 30, 2010
("This damage is being incurred because of short-term profit-induced inadequate planning
and implementation on the part of BP, its consultants and federal regulators."); see also Steve
Richards, I Hope the Slovenians Beat Us, INDEP. (U.K.), June zz, 201o, http://www.independent.
co.uk/opinion/commentators/steve-richards/steve-richards-i-hope-the-slovenians-beat-
us-2oo6897.html (referencing "the short-term, cost-cutting calculations from BP that led to
an environmental crisis in the US").
9 Jay Coen Gilbert, A Solution to the BP Problem: Changing the Rules of the Game, FORBEs
(June i, 2010, 3:11 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/csr/2o0lo/o6/ii/273/; see also Stephen
P. Berzon, et al., Conference Transcript, How Law Constructs Wealth Patterns, 15 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & PoCy 509, 521 (2009) [hereinafter Greenfield, Wealth Patterns] (Greenfield, Kent)
(drawing a link between short-termism and shareholder primacy). For an overview of the
debate about shareholder primacy and the protection of the interests of other stakeholders
and third parties, including in relation to environmental protection, see Ian B. Lee, Efficiency
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commentator adds that every segment of the corporate chain, including
directors, senior officers and line managers, is burdened by enormous
pressure to generate short-term profits."0 BP, the international energy
giant at the center of the Deep Horizon disaster, is not new to accusations
of short-termism. In 2008, two authors of a law review article concluded
from a collection of past industrial accidents" that BP was enmeshed in
the phenomenon of short-termism. The authors stated that the company
"has not resolved its central design challenge: How to structure internal
decision-making to give priority to long-term environmental sustainability
instead of short-term cost-cutting." 3
Recently also, Harvard Business School Professor Bill George undertook
a brief exploration of the issue of short-termism in the biotechnology
industry. 4 He examined a recent corporate battle that exemplifies the
andEthics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533 (20o6). For a strong
defense of shareholder primacy which rejects the arguments that shareholders do not own the
firm and lays a foundation for the allocation of power in a corporation in favor of shareholders,
see Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2oo U,. ILL. L. REV. 897. See generally
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-so-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 189,
1190-207 (2002) (outlining the pros and cons of shareholder primacy).
io Gilbert, supra note 9.
I I See TJ. Aulds, Thousands Line up to Join BP Lawsuit, DAILY NEws (Galveston County,
Tex.), Aug. 5, 2oo, http://galvestondailynews.com/story/i67178; Sheila McNulty & Anna
Fifiel, BP to Pay 'Record Fine over Texas City, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 12, 20o, http:/lwww.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/o/e878cca6-a63f-I Idf-8767-ool44feabdco.html; Jad Mouawad, For New Chief
BP's Problems Range from Rusted Pipes to a Tarnished Image, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2007, at C3
(quoting Congressman John Dingell); Steven Mufson, Probe Finds BP Cost-Cutting Contributed
to Texas Refinery Blast, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2006, at Doi; Michael Peel & Fiona Harvey,
Lawsuits Threaten BP over Air Pollution, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 9, 20io, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/o/o676bbf6-a3ce-I I df-9e3a-ooI44feabdco.html#axzz ihhWGMm3W.
12 Marjorie Kelly & Allen White, Corporate Design: The Missing Organizational and Public
Policy Issue of Our Time, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 761, 763-64 (zoo8).
13 Id. at 764. BP has been charged in past environmental and safety incidents with exces-
sive cost-saving. According to The Economist.
In 2oo5 an explosion at its rundown Texas City refinery killed 15 workers. It
received 97% of all operational safety and health citations for "wilful" [sic] and
"egregiously wilful" [sic] breaches at American oil refineries between June 2007
and February 2oo - a remarkable share even allowing for close scrutiny after
Texas City.
Some in the American oil industry think this reflects a poor corporate culture
at BP, in which personal advancement has depended more on cutting costs than
on technical proficiency.
The Oil Well andthe Damage Done: BP Counts the Political andFinancial Cost of Deepwater Horizon,
ECONOMIST, June 17, 2oIo, http://www.economist.com/node1638IO32; see also Colin L Leci,
Letter to the Editor, Don't Blame BP Engineers, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 22, 2007,
at 4. It should be noted that cost-cutting is not necessarily illegitimate, as good managers
always seek to maximize their resources. However, it could also be interpreted as a response
to short-term pressure.
14 Bill George, Another View: Can Biotech Survive Icahn, DEALBOOK (June 3, 2010, 9:15
AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2oio/o6/o3/another-view-can-biotech-survive-
20I1-2012]
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tension between investors pushing for the maximization of short-term
shareholder value and an industry largely dependent on substantial
investments and significant blocks of time for the creation of long-term
shareholder value. He concluded by wondering about the survivability
of the biotechnology industry that relies on long-term investment to
develop products that are critical to society. 5 This observation captures the
sentiment of many opponents of short-termism who note that the future
well-being of many investors, corporations, overall economy and society
at large is in jeopardy if investors with a near-term horizon, especially
hedge funds, enjoy a domineering influence in determining the direction
taken by a corporation. 6 One observer contends that an excessive focus on
the short-term engenders misallocation of assets by corporate managers,
leads to harmful volatility in the financial markets and imposes a burden
on society to channel productive resources into repairing environmental
and social damage occasioned by unbridled quest for profits. 7 Skeptics,
however, dismiss the concerns, insisting that the notion of pervasive short-
term investing is a figment of opponents' imagination. Moreover, short-
term investors provide needed liquidity and stability to the markets.
This article examines the ongoing debate about the import of the various
investment horizons and presents a critical appraisal of three prominent
proposals for addressing shareholder short-termism and encouraging
long-term investment, namely securities transaction tax, capital gains tax
reform, and loyalty dividends. 18 It acknowledges their strengths but also
icahn/.
15 Id.
16 R. FRANKLIN BALOTrI ET AL., MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS § 5-16 to -17 (discussing
the theory propounded by some commentators that the short-termism and activism exhibited
by certain investors present enormous threat to the economic health of corporations and the
country); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Cor-
porations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long
Term?, 66 Bus. LAW. 1, 12 (2010) [hereinafter Strine, Governance Question] ("[I]t is increasingly
the case that the agenda setters in corporate policy discussions are highly leveraged hedge
funds, with no long-term commitment to the corporations in which they invest.").
17 Steve Lydenberg, Building the Case for Long-Term Investing in Stock Markets: Breaking
Free from the Short-Term Measurement Dilemma, in FINANCE FOR A BETTER WORLD: THE SHIFT
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 168 (Henri-Claude de Bettignies & Franqois L6pineux eds., 2009);
see also Frederick Beale & Mario Fernando, Short-termism and Genuineness in Environmental
Initiatives: A Comparative Case Study of Two Oil Companies, 27 EUR. MGMT. J. 26, z7 (2009) ("[TI
he short-term focus on-the share price has been counterproductive for long run economic
growth as well as social cohesion and environmental sustainability."); Broc Romanek, Can We
Overcome Short-Termism?, TrhECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET (Sept. 22, 2009, 7:00 AM), http://www.
thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/2oo9/o9/can-we-overcome-short-termism.html ("Short-term
traders have little reason to care about long-term corporate performance - so are unlikely to
exercise a positive role in promoting corporate policies and can lead to market failures, social
and environmental degradation.").
18 See, e.g., Katharine Jackson, Pension-Funding the Future: Encouraging the Sustainable and
Socially Responsible Development of Securities Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, 44 INT'L LAW. 791,
[Vol. 100
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notes their weaknesses. For instance, because of the Wall Street Rule and
innovative avoidance vehicles, it is doubtful that even a high percentage
tax on capital gains or sale of securities will eliminate short-termism. 19 The
adequacy of the incentives provided by loyalty dividends both in terms of
financial rewards and shareholder empowerment appears questionable to
affect short-term investor behavior. In sum, these demerits caution against
creating a situation in which the remedy becomes worse than the malady.
Moreover, the management side of the equation deserves equal, if
not greater, engagement in seeking to craft solutions to the problem."0
Managerial myopia, independent of investor short-termism, may be a
contested fact, but there is sufficient reason to believe it exists." What is
needed is a framework that dissuades managers from their independent
short-termism and protects them from pressure from short-horizon
investors. In that connection, this article proposes the adoption of long-
term shareholder primacy as the guiding norm of corporate behavior. Thus,
managerial conduct and board supervision will be undertaken within the
rubric of this norm. The legal recognition and corporate internalization of
such a norm will provide a valuable underpinning for such reform proposals
as executive compensation reform and expansion of director fiduciary
duties that serve as dissuasion and insulation tools respectively.
The rest of the article proceeds in seven parts. Part I presents a synopsis
of the short-termism phenomenon, and the debate it has generated.
814 (zoO) (stating that one of the recommendations for dealing with short-termism is "regu-
lation of shareholder remuneration (dividend) programs so as to align them with long-term
interests"); Bus. & Soc'Y PROGRAM, ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A
MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 3 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter ASPEN INSTl, available at http://www.aspeninstitute.orglsites/default/files/content/images/
Overcoming%aoShort-termism%2oAspenCVSG%2o15deco9.pdf (proposing the imposition
of a securities transaction tax and reform of capital gains tax law to discourage short-term.
trading).
19 The Wall Street Rule refers to the practice by stockholders of selling their stock at
any point, especially when they are dissatisfied with the management of the corporation. See
Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate
Paradigm, II U. PA. J. Bus. L. 63 1, 670 (2009); Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increas-
ing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L.
REV. 379,406 (1994) ("The Wall Street Rule holds that shareholders who are dissatisfied with
management decisions can 'vote with their feet' by selling their shares and finding a different
enterprise in which to invest.").
20 Unless otherwise noted, this article uses the terms "management" or "managers" as
shorthand ways of referring "collectively to the corporation's board of directors and senior of-
ficers." See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 199o DUKE L.J. 201, 201 n. i.
21 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, Io88 (2007) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds] ("A
plausible argument can be made that it is managers, not just markets, that suffer from myopia
these days. Many CEOs are close to retirement age and, even among younger CEOs, turnover
is high. Executives' stock options continually vest and are exercised or hedged, if only to di-
versify their portfolio. Bonuses are often based on short-term performance goals.").
20II-20][2]
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Parts II, III and IV evaluate three proposals that have been advanced for
addressing shareholder short-termism, discussing their advantages and
disadvantages. Part V notes that any effort at addressing investor myopia
needs to be coupled With a strong effort to address managerial myopia.
While it may be the case that managers are pressured into short-term
thinking by shareholders, it is also true that managers can be independently
myopic. The coupling may be undertaken within the rubric of a corporate
norm of long-term shareholder primacy discussed in Part VI. Part VII is the
Conclusion.
I. THE SHORT-TERMISM PHENOMENON
A. The Concept of Short-Termism
Short-termism has been defined as "a preference for actions in the
near-term without due consideration of the long term consequences.""2
The Business Roundtable describes it as "the excessive focus of some
corporate leaders, investors, and analysts on short-term, quarterly earnings
and a lack of attention to the strategy, fundamentals, and conventional
approaches to long-term value creation." 3 Short-termism may exist both
in investing and in corporate management, thus, the focus of this article
is shareholder short-termism and the concomitant corporate myopia.2 4
Shareholder short-termism is said to manifest in two major ways, namely
'pressure' and 'walk.' Some shareholders' penchant for quick returns on
investment puts pressure on corporate managers to be fixated on short-
term results, even at the expense of long-run performance." Besides,
22 ALISON ATIERTON ET AL., INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES, CAUSES OF SHORT-
TERMISM IN THE FINANCE SECTOR 2 (2007), available at http://www.isf.uts.edu.au/publications/
atherton2007causesofshorttermism.pdf.
23 DEAN KREHMEYER ET AL., CFA CENTRE FOR FIN. MARKET INTEGRITY & Bus. ROUND-
TABLE INST. FOR CORP. ETHICS, BREAKING THE SHORT-TERM CYCLE: DISCUSSION AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS ON How CORPORATE LEADERS, ASSET MANAGERS, INVESTORS, AND ANALYSTS CAN
REFOCUS ON LONG-TERM VALUE 3 (2006).
24 Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience andthe White Man's Burden, 70 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 944, 949 (2002); see Bernard S. Black, Agents WatchingAgents: The Promise ofInstitutionalIn-
vestor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 8 11, 865 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Watching Agents] (discussing on
managerial myopia and its motivating factors); see also Bratton, supra note 5, at 1327-28 (dis-
cussing the myopia of Enron's managers); M.P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives forShort-Term
Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469, 1469-70 (1985) (attributing managerial myopia to reputational incen-
tives). See generally Eduard Gracia, Corporate Short-Term Thinking and the Winner-Take-AllMar-
ket(Deloitte Consulting, Working Paper, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractjid=44526o (attributing managerial myopia to a "winner-take-all" mentality).
25 See Patrick Bolton et al., Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in
Speculative Markets, 30 J. CORP. L. 721, 725 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do
Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719,
719-20 (1993); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61,
[Vol. IOO
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shareholders have a tendency to prefer "exit" to "voice."2 6 That is, they
would rather sell their stock if dissatisfied with corporate management
61-62 (1988); Bohren, Priestley & Odegaard, supra note 3, at 14 ("[Wlhen short-termist inves-
tors influence the firm over extended periods, they pressure managers into myopic behavior
which reduces firm value.... [As] managers try to maintain high short-term earnings at the
expense of profitable long-term projects.").
z6 Louis LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE
ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 91-92 (1988); see also J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe,
100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2411 (1991) ("Exit is the mechanism of organizational abandonment in
the face of unsatisfactory performance. Voice is the mechanism of intraorganizational correc-
tion and recuperation."). The exit-voice formulation was initially made by the economist
Albert Hirschman. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970) ("Voice is ... defined as any attempt at all to
change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through indi-
vidual or collective petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher
authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or through various types of
actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion."). A slightly
different articulation of the concepts presents exit and voice as "variants of the same phe-
nomenon," rather than as alternate phenomena. See SARAH MAXWELL, TIE PRICE IS WRONG:
UNDERSTANDING WHAT MAKES A PRICE SEEM FAIR AND THE TRUE COST OF UNFAIR PRICING 76
(2008) ("Having a choice gives consumers voice by allowing them to express their opinion.
They are not being forced to buy at one pre-set price or do without."); Andrew E. Taslitz,
JudgingJena' D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 428-29
(2009) ("A buyer having a real choice among a range of viable alternatives and the freedom to
exit one potential deal for a better one gives the buyer some measure of voice.").
2011-2012]
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than stay in and affect direction of corporate policy. 7 Ultimately, this works
against good corporate performance. 8
Short-termism is not limited to any particular section of the investor
class, although .the investors most often associated with it are hedge funds. 9
27 There are similar reactions by employees. Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring Progress Un-
der China's Labor Law: Goals, Processes, Outcomes, 30 CoMP. LAB. L. & POCv J. 373, 393 (2009)
("There are indications that workers will resort to 'exit' rather than 'voice' if confrontational
tactics do not look promising."). There are similar reactions within the lawyer-client rela-
tionship. William L.E. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1447, 1464 (1992) ("In the face
of lawyers' insistence that they accommodate themselves to the reality of what the law allows,
clients generally persist, at least initially, in expounding their needs, explaining their notions
of justice, or reiterating their objectives. But rarely do they insist that their lawyer make a par-
ticular demand, argue a particular position, or even endorse their view. Where dissatisfaction is
great, the usual client response is exit rather than voice."); cf. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals?
Towarda New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 207i
(2010) (discussing how some clients and attorneys utilize voice in their relationship, although
the threat of exit remains in the vicinity).
28 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 26, at 9i-92. According to Hirschman,
[Slituations in which exit is the predominant reaction to decline while voice might
be more efficacious in arresting it can also be observed in the sphere of private
business enterprise. The relation between corporate management and the stock-
holders is a case in point. When the management of a corporation deteriorates,
the first reaction of the best-informed stockholders is to look around for the stock
of better-managed companies. In thus orienting themselves toward exit, rather
than toward voice, investors are said to follow the Wall Street rule that "if you do
not like the management you should sell your stock." According to a well-known
manual this rule "results in perpetuating bad management and bad policies."
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 26, at 46. The problem is not simply that shareholders are exiting.
The problem is that often the type of shareholder that exits quickly is the one that can make
a real difference because it is well-informed and is likely to have the motivation and deter-
mination to mount a serious fight for change if the alternative of investing elsewhere was not
readily present. Thus, the real tragedy is that those shareholders who are most sophisticated
and "who, therefore, are those who would be the most active, reliable, and creative agents of
voice are for that very reason are those who are apparently likely to exit first in case of dete-
rioration." Id. at 47; see also Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA I, 5 (2OOs)
(stating that the exercise of voice by shareholders and other constituents make a firm more
efficient because, among other things, "active monitors may turn down a negative NPV [net
present value] project sponsored by management, force the divestiture of a noncore division,
or remove management altogether.")
29 See Kevin J. Coco, Empty Manipulation: Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2or9 and Ownership
Disclosure in Chapter i Cases, zoo8 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 61o, 619; Jennifer Ralph Oppold, The
Changing Landscape of Hedge Fund Regulation: Current Concerns and a Principle-Based Approach,
Io U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 833, 869-70 (2oo8); see also Faith Stevelman, Going Private at the
Intersection of the Market and the Law, 62 Bus. LAW. 775, 902 (2007) ("[Ilnstitutional investors
(especially hedge funds) are increasingly positioning themselves to respond to short term
market price changes, as intensified by the role of arbitrageurs in corporate transactions.").
However, there is not a clear definition of hedge funds. Oppold, supra, at 833-34 ("The term
'hedge fund' does not have a single accepted definition although it is generally understood to
be an unregistered pooled investment vehicle that invests in a broad range of securities, with
a fee structure that typically compensates the fund advisor based upon a combination of assets
under management and a percent of capital appreciation.").
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This is intuitive as the investment strategy of hedge funds, including
speculation, naturally comport with buying and holding stock for short
periods of time.3" However, the hedge fund industry is not alone in this
practice. "Speculation is found-not merely in the operation of hedge funds
and in derivatives trading, but also in a large population of high-turnover
portfolio ma.nagers ready to jump in and out of the market."31 Some of the
pension funds that traditionally invest with a long-term horizon have also
joined the bandwagon, committing some of their assets to high turnover
managers or hedge funds.3" Also involved in the speculation excursion are
high turnover individuals and day traders.33
Analysts also view major institutional investors as contributing to short-
termism by creating a disconnect between asset owners and asset managers.
One of the areas in which this misalignment manifests is in investment
time horizon.34 Because many of these institutions engage in quarterly
evaluation of their fund managers' performance, the fund managers have
little option than to deploy their efforts into delivery of short-term returns,
often necessitating putting pressure on investee companies to focus on
maximizing near-term profits. 3 Another area in which interests are not
30 MATTEo TONELLO, TE CONFERENCE BD., REVISITING STOCK MARKET SHORT-TERMISM
7 (2oo6) ("[Sitock investment speculation is a major cause of market short-termism. Some
blamed the rise of the hedge fund industry, which is speculative by definition."); Kahan &
Rock, Hedge Funds, supra note 2 1, at Io87 ("Short-termism... presents the potentially most
important, most controversial, most ambiguous, and most complex problem associated with
hedge fund activism."); see also Catherine L. Pollina, Bursting the Speculation Buying Bubble:
Modifications to the Capital Gains Provision andthe 1o31 Exchange Rule, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 27 1,
273 (2007) (defining speculative buying as the purchase of an asset "based on the speculation
of appreciation of future value instead of using an analysis of the property's income funda-
mentals."); James R. Repetti, The Use of Tax Law to Stabilize the Stock Market: The Efficacy of
Holding Period Requirements, 8 VA. TAX REV. 591, 596 (1989) [hereinafter Repetti, Tax Law] ("[S]
peculation is the purchase of an item with a view to selling it at a higher price within a short
period of time.").
31 TONELLO, supra note 30, at 7.
32 Id.; see also Greenfield, Wealth Patterns, supra note 9, at 521.
33 TO NELLO, supra note 30, at 7 ("Sitting and waiting for long-term growth is simply not
contemplated in the strategies of those investors who are willing to take huge risks to enjoy
multiple-digit capital appreciation.").
34 See Li Jin, How Does Investor Short-Termism Affect Mutual Fund Manager Short-termism
2-3 (April 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.hbs.edu/units/am/pdf/
short.termism-paper_05o414.pdf ("[F]und managers facing higher short-term performance
pressure are more focused on short horizon investments ... [and] fund manager's short invest-
ment horizons are caused by their investors' short horizons, but not the other way round.").
35 Simon Wong, Tackling the Root Causes of Shareholder Passivity and Short-Termism, HARv.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. Uan. 31, 2010, 9:41 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.
edu/corpgov/2o /01/3 I/tackling-the-root-causes-of-shareholder-passivity-and-short-
termism/; cf. Lydenberg, supra note 17, at 170 (explaining the benefits of long-term invest-
ment).
2011-2012]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
aligned is in asset manager compensation.36 A number of pension funds
maintain a fee structure that involves non-payment of management fees,
which could be assessed as a percentage of assets under management, in
exchange for a permission to lend the shares and earn a financial return
as a result.3 7 The attendant problem is that the severely conflicted asset
manager has virtually no incentive to maximize the value of the portfolio.3"
For example, waging a successful proxy contest might require that the lent
shares be recalled for the purpose of voting but the fund manager may
be reluctant to do so because of the revenue loss that such recall would
occasion.3 9
B. The Short Term - Long Term Debate
1. Historical Overview.-For approximately three decades now, academic
commentators, corporate lawyers, the investment community, and
other interested parties have been commenting on the short-termism
phenomenon. 40 While in the past, concerns about short-termism were easily
dismissed as ideologically motivated, there is a resurgence of interest in the
subject from quarters that cut across the ideological divide.4' This priority
of attention has been attributed to the financial scandals of 2001-2002 that
highlighted the harmful effects of short-termism as well as the growing
interest in the potentially positive role that environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) factors can play in improving long-term performance. 41
Consternation about short-termism intensified with the collapse of
some venerable financial firms in 2008 and the threat it posed to the stock
markets, economy and the society at large. 43 The development raised
questions about the role that an obsession with short term results by
investors played in the debacle and revived a decades-old debate about
how to curb the excesses of short-termism, while encouraging long term
investing.44 On one side of the debate are those who strongly view short-
termism both as the culprit and as a continuing threat to the economy.
36 Wong, supra note 35.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See Beale & Fernando, supra note 17, at 27.
41 See TONELLO, supra note 3o , at 13.
42 David Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier
of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 221, 224 (2007).
43 See, e.g., Lawrence Mitchell, Protect Industry from Predatory Speculators, FIN. TMMES
(London), July 8, 2009, http:lwww.ft.com/intl/cmslslolfac88ib6-6be5-i Ide-932o-oo44fe-
abdco.html#axzzi deHJelKG.
44 See Beale & Fernando, supra note 17, at 27 (stating that the debate surrounding the
existence, cause and possible solutions to the issue of short-termism began in the 198os).
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Opposing them are those who dismiss the thought that short-termism is
indeed a problem that warrants any form of public or private intervention.4"
2. Arguments Supporting Existence and Regulation of Short-termism.-Some
corporate and securities law scholars view investing with a short-term
horizon as hazardous. 46 Their concern stems from reasoning that short-
term-driven corporate policy or practice often translates to the pursuit
of investments that are profitable in the short term, but unsustainable
in the long run. They see the current activism of hedge funds and other
institutional shareholders focused on immediate gains as detrimental both
to the well-being of the corporation and the public. 47 The Conference
Board summarizes the problem as follows:
On a macro-economic level, short-term visions are the cause
for market volatility and the instability of financial institutions.
From the micro-economic standpoint, they undermine
management continuity and expose a public company to the risk
of losing sight of its strategic business model, compromising its
competitiveness. In addition, the pressure to meet short-term
numbers may induce senior managers to search for a number
of business costs (i.e. the cost of a state-of-the-art pollution
control system) to externalize, often to the detriment of the
environment and future generations.4"
The contention is that where management pays undue attention to
quarterly earnings per share, it may put on hold or jettison investments
45 For an extensive and excellent discussion of the causes of short-termism, see Lynne
Dallas, Short-termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CouP. L. 265 (2012)..
46 See Ed Waitzer, The Case for Realigning Shareholder Incentives, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada),
Jan. 25, 201o, at B8 (viewing short-termism as hazardous); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1210
(2003) [hereinafter Mitchell, Sarbanes-Oxley] ("Short-term investing breeds excessive volatil-
ity and damages investor confidence in the markets. Short-term investing pressures managers
to engage in short-term management, damaging the future prospects of the corporation with
promiscuous layoffs, inadequate funding for research and development, environmental pol-
lution and substandard production quality. Short-term investing drives managers to manage
earnings, not business.").
47 Waitzer, supra note 46 ("Simply put, what you do for the short term is often opposed to
what you want (or what is socially desirable) in the long term."); see also Stephen Bainbridge,
The Fruits of Shareholder Activism, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM Uune 3, 20o, 11:25 AM), http://
www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2o i o/o6/the-fruits-of-share holder-
activism.html (responding to a recent shareholder struggle in the biotechnology industry and
arguing that proceeding with then contemplated legislative changes on shareholder empower-
ment would further enable short-term oriented shareholders to "pursue their private gains at
the expense of other shareholders and the public good"); cf Oppold, supra note 29, at 869-70
(indicating that hedge fund investors may not always hurt companies long-term performance).
48 TONELLO, supra note 3o , at 42.
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that increase long-term.value but negatively affect near-term earnings. 49
Empirical basis for this conclusion exists. Some studies have. found that
Research and Development ("R&D") cuts are quite likely in companies
where. the dominant shareholders are "transient" institutions, i.e., those
with high portfolio turnover and robust trading strategies. 0 A survey of
over .400 financial executives revealed that more than 80 percent of the
respondents would reduce discretionary spending in the areas of R&D,
advertising, maintenance, and hiring to meet short-term earnings targets.,
Fifty percent responded that they would delay new projects, even when
such delay translates to sacrifices in value creation. 2
According to the Aspen Institute, those asset managers that thrive on "a
primary focus on short-term trading gains have little reason to care about
long-term corporate performance or externalities, and so are unlikely
to exercise a positive role in promoting corporate policies, including
appropriate proxy voting and corporate governance policies, that are
beneficial and sustainable in the long-term." 3 Thus, some commentators
conclude that an emphasis on short-term results "makes it increasingly
difficult for the corporation to maintain the long-term focus necessary to
its own and society's well-being." 4
Conversely, long-term shareholders have interests that go beyond
immediate stock price maximization, and thus are better positioned to
advocate corporate policies that are in alignment with general societal
expectations of corporations. 5 Indeed, to the extent that companies get
49 William W, Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 702 (2010).
50 Id. at 702-03 n.154; see also Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on
Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 AccT. REV. 305, 306 (1998) ("Myopic investment behavior
is a type of earning management that is most likely to happen when managers face a trade-off
between meeting earnings targets and maintaining R&D investment.").
51 Kurt N. Schacht, Breaking the Short-Term Cycle, in FOURTH ANNiJAL DIRECTOR'S INSTI-
TUTE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, at 583,591 (2006).
52 Id. But see George W, Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders andthe Myth of Investor
Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 1z6-28 (2olo).
53 ASPEN INST., supra note 18, at 2.
54 Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The
QuinquennialElection of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 203 (199i); see also Beale & Fernando,
supra note 17, at 26-27 ("[Short-termism is] counterproductive for long run economic growth
as well as social cohesion and environmental sustainability. It discourages long-term consid-
erations such as the environment, or social responsibility."); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Criti-
cal Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1292-94 (1992) (arguing that short-
termism impedes management focus on long term goals, including social goals).
55 See, e.g., Hess, supra note 42, at 228-29 (stating that while a short term focus ignores or
exacerbates environmental conditions, a long-term focus embraces environmental consider-
ations in the march toward economic growth); Jennifer Hill, Pension Funds Must Heed Climate
Change: Gore, Reuters, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2oo7/o3/i4/us-britain-
pensions-gore-idUSL 14541 13920070314.
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fixated on the near-term, the failure to give proper attention to social,
ethical, or environmental issues may lead to reputational damage, stock
price volatility and increase in the cost of capital.16 Arguably, long-term
investors may be concerned about social and environmental issues, not
because of any deep and abiding interest in these issues but because they
recognize that ignoring them may ultimately pose a significant danger to
their financial bottom line. 7 Considering the problem from that perspective,
long term enthusiasts suggest that public policy should identify with the
interests of long-term shareholders and either curtail the power of short
horizon investors or attach appropriate responsibility to accompany the
exercise of that power.5"
3. Arguments Denying Short-termism and Against Regulation.-Not every
corporate scholar accepts the foregoing arguments. Defense of investor
short-termism takes a number of forms. One category of defenders doubts
its existence or claim it is a managerial, not a shareholder, problem.59
Professor George Dent's observation below encapsulates this school of
thought:
First, "for all the anecdotal evidence of short-termism and its
effects, there is not a lot of empirical data to back it up." "[N]
o one has demonstrated that the long/short phenomenon exists.
.. " Undoubtedly some investors trade on the basis of short-
term performance, but this is no more important than that some
investors trade on the basis of astrology. All that is needed for
56 Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the An-
glo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 547 (2005).
57 Marleen A. O'Connor, OrganizedLaboras ShareholderActivist: Building Coalitions to Pro-
mote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 1345, 1350(1997) ("patient investors are beginning
to evaluate aspects of labor relations not on social grounds, but as indicators of companies'
potential to innovate in an intensely competitive environment."); Jason S. Johnston, Signaling
Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market Incentives for Corporate Environmental
Performance I I (U. Pa. L. Sch. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. o5-16, 2005),available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=725 103 (stating that a rational investor is concerned about regula-
tory liability and compliance costs because they affect the firm's financial bottom line even
when such investor may not care about third party harms in the form of pollution or unfavor-
able working conditions).
58 Apart from public policy calls, analysts also sound a note of caution about the impli-
cations of obsession with short-term investing, pointing attention to the 1929 stock market
crash, which shares a similar characteristic of short holding periods. See Justin Lahart, Wrong
Way? Street Signs Point to Speed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at Ci.
59 George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: StillBroke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J. CoRP. L. 39,
54 (zoo6) ("Claims that investors promote detrimental 'short-termism' are also ill-founded.");
see also George W. Dent, Jr., For Optional Federal Incorporation, 35 J. CORP. L., 499, 514 (2oio)
(stating that credible evidence of significant shareholder short-termism is lacking and that
the -self-centered incentives of executives, not shareholder pressure, account for whatever
short-termism problem that exists).
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markets to be efficient is a critical mass of rational investors.
"[Clompetition among investors who do not suffer from a short-
term bias will drive stock price toward an unbiased level."
'
Some of the defenders of short-termism have relied on the efficient
capital markets hypothesis ("E.C.M.H.") which posits that the present
value of a company's long-term position is reflected in the short-term price
of its stock. 61 That being the case, investor orientations, whether short or
long- term, are immaterial. 61 In that connection, one scholar notes that "the
'short-termism' argument depends on the belief that the stock market
systematically undervalues companies that pursue long-term investment
projects . . .," adding that the "belief does not seem to be supported by the
evidence.
63
The E.C.M.H., however, has "fallen into serious disrepair" in recent
years, with contemporary theorists "conced[ing] that stock market prices
often depart substantially from reasonable estimates of fundamental
economic value."' Some scholars contend that "some of the assumptions
underlying the E.C.M.H. may be overly optimistic, particularly those
regarding the ability of the market to accurately value long-term risks and
investments. ' 65 Indeed, the financial crisis of 2008 revealed significantly
6o George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1107, 11 IO (2oo8) (alterations in original) (citations omitted); see also George W. Dent,
Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1213, 1235-39 (zoo8) (questioning the assumption that there was a
conflict between short- and long-term investors).
61 See Rebecca A. Crawford, Corporate Governance Reform: How to Promote the Long-Term
Health and Value of U.S. Corporations, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 905, 918 (2009). For a critical ap-
praisal of the efficient markets hypothesis, see Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, andMarket Risk,
89 OR. L. REV 175, 20-O8 (2010).
62 Crawford, supra note 6I, at 918; see also Mark G. Robilotti, Codetermination, Stakeholder
Rights, and Hostile Takeovers: A Reevaluation of the Evidence from Abroad, 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 536,
565 (1997) ("[In the 199osl several scholars argued that even if managers are focused on the
short-term, the stock market operates efficiently over the long term.").
63 Donald W. Kiefer, The Security Transactions Tax: An Overview of the Issues, 48 TAx NOTES
885, 895 (1990); see also G. William Schwert & Paul J. Seguin, Securities Transaction Taxes: An
Overview of Costs, Benefits and Unresolved Questions, FIN. ANALYST J., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 27, 29.
64 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary DutiesforActivist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1255, 1291 (2OO8); A Different Class: Would Giving Long-Term Shareholders More Clout Improve
Corporate Governance?, ECONOMIST, Feb. zo, zoio, at 66 [hereinafterA Different Class] ("Share-
holders can no longer with a straight face cite the efficient-market hypothesis as evidence
that rising share prices are always evidence of better prospects, rather than of an unsustainable
bubble.").
65 Williams & Conley, supra note 56, at 502 fi.38;; see also Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanics
ofMarket Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, z8 J. CORP. L. 635, 637 (2003) ("lIt is
difficult for a disinterested observer not to suspect that efficient market theory fails, in some
fundamental respect, to capture the reality of securities markets."); Cf GEORGE A. AKERLOF &
ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY
IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 132 (2009) ("To pretend that stock prices reflect people's
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different outcomes for short and long run investors and questioned the
notion that markets always reflect fundamental value or that investors are
always purely rational in their approach to trading.'
Another category of defenders is willing to acknowledge concerns
with short-termism but reluctant to figuratively throw out the baby
with the bathwater.67 They note that corporate managers have long
relied upon the long horizon argument as a smokescreen to hide their
lackluster performance and ward off activist investors intent on energizing
underperforming corporations.61 Along similar lines, support for short-
term shareholding has also stemmed from the angle that some evidence,
although inconclusive, indicate that the efforts of short-term shareholders,
especially activist hedge funds, can positively affect the fortunes of poorly
run target companies.'
Indeed, a short-term outlook is not intrinsically wrong.70 That
investment decisions are made from a short term perspective does not
automatically imply that they are inferior.7 Similarly, bad decisions may
use of information about those future payoffs is like hiring a weather forecaster who has gone
berserk.").
66 AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 65, at 36-37; Nina Walton, On the OptimalAllocation of
Power Between Shareholders and Managers i I n.5 (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ., & Org., Re-
search Paper No. C Io-1 2, 2oIo) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract.
id=I654I6 5 ("[Sihort-run investors in investment banks benefited greatly from these banks
investing in sub prime mortgage securities, while long-run investors experienced either a
significant drop in the value of their equity or a complete wipe-out.").
67 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism: The Case for Non-Intervention,
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2008, AT 6, 7; Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds, supra note 21, at
IO83-9I.
68 Joe Nocera, A Defense of Short-Ternism, N.Y. 'fiMES, July 29, 2oo6, at Ci; see also MARK
J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FI-
NANCE 242-43 (1994) (criticizing managers fear of takeovers by short-term investors); Joseph
A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45
STAN. L. REV. 857, 87O-73 (1993) (discussing the state of many companies that were takeover
targets and their post-takeover status); Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis
and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 6, 11 (1986) (discussing the argument that the fear of
takeover induces myopic behavior in corporate managers, leading to jettisoning by the man-
agers of long-term benefits for the purpose of increasing short-term profits, but arguing that
such managers may be mistaken, in which case it is more beneficial to the corporation and the
economy to remove them and create room for a change in strategy and more efficient deploy-
ment of resources).
69 A Different Class, supra note 64; Oppold, supra note 29, at 870.
70 Kuang-Wei Chueh, Is Hedge FundActivism New Hopefor the Market?, 2oo8 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 724, 743 (noting that long-term wealth creation may be consistent with the pursuit of
short-term interest but that "concern arises only when short-term interest conflicts with the
company's long term interest and the latter outweighs the former.").
71 See ALISON ATHERTON ET AL., INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES, PARADIGM SHIFT TO
LONG-TERMISM: ACTION PLAN FOR THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCE SECTOR 2 (2007) [hereinafter
ATHERTON, PARADIGM SHIFT], http://www.isf.uts.edu.au/publications/athertonetalzoo7para-
digmshift.pdf.
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also be grounded on a long term perspective." One scholar persuasively
reasons that "it is not clear that a long-term investment horizon is always
better than a short-term one. Investing for the long term entails greater
risks and opportunity costs than investing for the short term. One cannot
always sacrifice the present for the future."7 3 Investors make the balancing
decision considering a variety of variables, including their level of tolerance
for risk. Accordingly, the argument goes, the law ought to tread softly and
preferably should not take sides on the issue.74 In addition, the interests
of long-term and short-term investors can coalesce to impel managers
to act in the best interests of the corporation, for instance, by pushing
managers to drop capital investments and acquisitions that add little
value or to distribute excess cash to investors.7" Moreover, and perhaps
more significantly, investors who trade on the short-term provide needed
liquidity and stability in the stock markets.7 6
In summary, it is proper to "recognize that there is a Valid role and function
for all types of horizons and approaches to investment.""7 The problem
with short-termism is when it detrimentally conflicts with the company's
long-term interest.7" The following three parts evaluate proposals that are
currently at the top of the short-termism discourse. These proposals fall
into two categories, namely public and private.79 Two prominent public
72 Id.
73 Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 605, 637
(2007) [hereinafter Velasco, Shareholder Rights].
74 Id.
75 Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds, supra note 2 !, at io88-89.
76 ATHERTON, PARADIGM SHIFT, supra note 71, at 2 ("[A] degree of short-termism is need-
ed for market liquidity."); Damon Silvers, Commentary on "Toward Common Sense and Common
Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of
Corporate Governance" by Leo E. Strine, Jr., 33 J. CORP. L. 85, 92 (2007) (arguing that short-term
investing is not an unmitigated bad because "[mlarginal traders contribute information to the
market place through continual evaluations of company prospects, and their activities provide
liquidity to all investors when they need it"); Mitchell, Sarbanes-Oxey, supra note 46, at 1209
("[Sipecialists and market makers at least stabilize the mairket by matching supply and de-
mand."); see also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stork Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure,
and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 6 1, 683 (t995) [hereinafter Stout, Casinos] ("'Liquid-
ity' refers to an investor's ability to sell an asset quickly without having to offer a discount from
the prevailing market price."); TARUN CHORDIA ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y, COMMON
DETERMINANTS OF BOND AND STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY: THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CRISES,
MONETARY POLICY, AND MUTUAL FUND FLOWS I (2OOI), available at http://www.newyorkfed.
org/research/staff.reports/srl4I.html ("Liquidity... can be defined as the ability to buy or sell
large quantities of an asset quickly and at low cost.").
77 MERCER & IRRC INST., INVESTMENT HORIZONS: Do MANAGERS Do WHAT THEY SAY? 2
(2010).
78 See Kuang-Wei Chueh, supra note 70, at 743.
79 See Kelly & White, supra note 12, at 774-75 (stating that a number of institutions have
proposed solutions to the short-termism problem including the Aspen Institute, the Confer-
ence Board, the UK's Marathon Club and Australia's Institute for Sustainable Futures).
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policy proposals are an excise tax on securities transactions and capital
gains tax reform. On the private front, the idea of a loyalty dividend is one
that is gaining increasing attention in the corporate governance discourse. s'
The common feature of these proposals is that their proponents' primary
objective appears to be a strong interest in ensuring that people own shares
for a considerable period of time and thus take an "ownership approach"
to their interest in the corporation, instead of seeing themselves as tourists,
guests, or renters trying to make the best of their temporary stay, without
adequate regard to what happens when they leave.8
Additionally, the proposals proceed on the understanding that at the
end of the day, one is unlikely to count on the active involvement of long-
term shareholders in the absence of clear incentives. On the same note,
short-term investors are not likely to change their investment patterns
unless the incentive to continue disappears. In essence, it is unlikely that
investor behavior will change without the appropriate incentives.8 1
II. SECURITIES TRANSACTION TAX
A. Preliminary Points
The idea of deploying a securities transaction tax to address perceived
problems in the financial world is not exactly of recent vintage. John Maynard
Keynes proposed a stock transfer tax many decades ago to "mitigat[e] the
predominance of speculation over enterprise in the United States.""a In
the 1970s, Nobel Economics Laureate James Tobin proposed a financial
transactions tax for the foreign currency markets to curb speculation in
cross country trades by taxing away quick gains on such speculation. a4 This
8o See Waitzer, supra note 46 (stating that the idea of loyalty dividends have been pro-
posed in the Netherlands for shareholders who hold bank shares for at least four years); ATHER-
TON, PARADIGM SHIFT, supra note 71, at j6 (recommending investigation into "the feasibility
and effectiveness of a scheme to incentivize long-term investment by rewarding longer-term
shareholding through additional dividends").
8I This issue has become persistently problematic. See ROBERT KUTrNER, TIE
SQUANDERING OF AMERICA: How THE FAILURE OF OUR POLITICS UNDERMINES OUR PROSPERITY
144 (2007); see also Jennifer G. Hill, Then and Now: Professor Berle and the Unpredictable
Shareholder, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1005, 1011(201 O) [hereinafter Hill, Unpredictable Shareholder]
(restating an observation that some institutional investors' practices portray them more as
financial traders than owners or joint managers of the corporation).
82 ATHERTON, PARADIGM SHIFT, supra note 71, at 3 ("[Wlithout specifically constructed
long-termism incentives, investor behavior will not change.")
83 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, TH1E GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY
16o (Harcourt, Brace & World 1964) (1936).
84 James Tobin, A Proposalfor InternationalMonetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153, 155 (1978)
[hereinafter Tobin, Monetary Reform]; see Amy Youngblood Avitable, Saving the World One Cur-
rency ata Time: Implementing the Tobin Tax, 8o WASH. U. L.Q. 391,392 (2002) (stating that the tax
was originally valued at one percent but was subsequently reduced); Rolf H. Weber, Challenges
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disincentive tax is specifically designed to place an extra weight on fast-
moving capital in order to reduce short-term speculation without damaging
the long-term benefits of exchange.85 Thus, it deviates from the central
purpose of taxation, which is to raise revenue.8 6 Instead, the transaction
tax has a closer affinity to the "sin taxes" imposed on alcohol and tobacco
consumption in the belief that resulting higher prices of these products will
make consumers disinclined to use them.87 According to Professor Tobin,
forthe New FinancialArchitecture, 31 HONG KONG L.J. 241, 252 (2001) (describing the Tobin tax
as a disincentive tax); see also Enrique R. Carrasco & Kristen J. Berg, Praxis-Oriented Pedagogy:.
The E-Book on International Finance and Development, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 733, 744 (1999)
(examining Tobin's financial transaction tax); Tobin Tax Initiative, CTR. FOR ENVrL. ECON. DEV.,
http://www.ceedweb.orgliirp/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2oi I) (providing informational links on
Tobin Taxes); Fact Sheet on Tobin Taxes, CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON. DEV., http://www.ceedweb.
org/iirp/factsheet.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) (outlining how Tobin Taxes function); cf
Thomas I. Palley, Speculation and Tobin Taxes: Why Sand in the Wheels Can Increase Economic
Effitncy, 69 J. ECON. 113, 122-24 (1999) (highlighting the policy arguments for a Tobin Tax).
85 Robin Paul Malloy, Mortgage Market Reform and the Fallacy of Seff-Correcting Markets, 30
PACE L. REV. 79, 110 (2oo9); Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads
of the Neoliberal Contagion, 7 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 85, 113 (s999); Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg,
Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAx L. REV. 537, 554 (2003); James Tobin, International
Currency Regimes, Capital Mobility and Macroeconomic Policy, 15 GREEK ECON. REV. I, I I (1993)
("These markdts are engines that work all too well technically but do not work all that well
economically, especially macro-economically. The sand in the wheels would take the form of
transactions taxes, which direct trader's attention to long-run fundamentals and away from
transient contagious market sentiment."); see also JAMES TOBIN, TIE NEW ECONOMICS ONE
DECADE OLDER 89 (1974) (expounding the financial transactions tax).
86 Geoffrey G.B. Brow, The Tobin Tax: Turning Soros into Plowshares?, 9 T"ASNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 345,376 (1999). The ability of the tax to raise significant sums of money that
can be put into diverse uses cannot easily be discounted, but the primary purpose, as Professor
Tobin argued, is to discourage persons interested in reaping a quick gain from a round-trip
trade to another currency, thereby limiting volatility and promoting stability. Tobin, Monetary
Reform, supra note 84, at 153-59; see also Amy McFarlane, In the Business of Development: Devel-
opment Policy in the First Two Years of the Bush Administration, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 521, 538
(2003) (discussing a German feasibility study suggesting that a Tobin tax "could provide sta-
bility for exchange markets and discourage speculation while providing an intergovernmental
organization, such as the U.N., with increased funds for development aid"). For a discussion
of the revenue-raising potential of the Tobin tax and a sampling of the various uses to which
the proceeds may be put, see KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITAN,
NATIONALISM, AND PATRIOTISM 8o-8 1, 94-95 (2004). See also David E. Pozen, Tax Expenditures
as Foreign Aid, 116 YALE L.J. 869, 879 (2007) (suggesting that there are numerous uses for the
tax revenue); Paulette L. Stenzel, Why and How the World Trade Organization Must Promote
Environmental Protection, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & Po'Y F. 1, 40 (2002) ("Funds raised from this
tax would be used to provide funds for sustainable development projects in poor countries.");
William R. White, Note, The Tobin Tax: A Solution to Today's International Monetary Instability?,
1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 365, 389 (1999) ("[Tlhe revenue raised by the [Tobin] Tax would
be substantial, and could be used either by individual nations or international organizations to
fund their activities."). See generally Myron Frankman, Beyond the Tobin Tax: Global Democracy
anda Global Currency, 581 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 62 (2002) (discussing the Tobin
Tax and alternative solutions to the challenges of the global economy).
87 Brow, supra note 86, at 376; see William N. Thompson, Gambling Taxes: The Philosophy,
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the transaction tax "would automatically penalize short-horizon round
trips, while negligibly affecting the incentives for commodity trade and
long-term capital investments." s
B. Arguments in Favor of a Securities Transaction Tax
It is with regard to the stock market that this excise tax proposal has
been resurrected and gaining increasing fervor.8 9 The extension of the tax
to stocks is not expected to diminish the value of the shares but may be
beneficial in addressing problems associated with buying stocks and selling
them too rapidly.90 The essence of this tax is to reduce the incentive for
short-term trades by taking away the profit motivation for such transactions
and thus induce the traders to change their behavior in the direction of
long term shareholding.91 "So, a built-in effect of this idea is to encourage
the 'rational person' to invest for the long-term by minimizing the impact
the Constitution and Horizontal Equiy, 17VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.'3 89 , 406 (20o0) ("High taxes
on liquor, for instance, have been justified on the basis that the tax will add to the cost of liquor
and thereby discourage consumption of a 'bad' thing."); see also Theresa A. Gabaldon, John
Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions,
26 J. CORP. L. 225, 24 1-46 (2001) (hereinafter Gabaldon, Euphoric Market] (analogizing stock
market speculation to gambling and calling for a transactions tax, among other proposals, to
remedy the problem).
88 James Tobin, Prologue to 'ME TOBIN TAx: COPING WITH FINANCIAL VOLATILITY, at xi
(Mahbub ul Haq et al. eds., 1996).
89 See, e.g., ASPEN INST., supra note 18, at 3 (recommending an excise tax on stock market
transactions to curb short-term investing); CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, SUPPORT FOR A
FINANCIAL TRtANSACTIONS TAx (FTT) (2011), http://www.cepr.net/documents/ftt-support.pdf
(last visited Dec. 31, 2011) (providing a long list of supporters for a tax on the financial services
industry).
90 See, e.g., LOWENSTEIN, supra note 26, at 86-87 (referencing proposed taxation of gains
from sale of stocks or derivatives held for less than a year at oo percent); Caroline Bradley,
Disorderly Conduct: Day Traders and the Ideology of "Fair and Orderly Markets", 26 J. CORP. L. 63,
94 (zooo) (referencing a proposal by the Center for Economic and Policy Research to tax se-
curities transactions as a way of discouraging speculation); Robert Hockett, What Kinds of Stock
Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and "Ownership Societies", 92 CORNELL
L. REV. 865, 939 (2007) (arguing that such a tax could be used to address speculative tenden-
cies by those who receive public assistance to invest in the stock market).
91 The same rationale applies in the currency context. See Joseph M. Schwartz, Democrazy
Against the Free Market: The Enron Crisis and the Politics of Global Deregulation, 35 CONN. L. REv.
1097, 1120-21 (2003). ("Imposing a global 'Tobin tax' on all transfers of liquid capital (stock
and bond market investments and short-term bank deposits) would decrease the incentive
for short-term capital flight aimed at disrupting sovereign nation-state policy."); Roman Ter-
Srill, Coping With Private CapitalMarkets, 9gT ANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 304,311 (999) ("A
tax on spot-currency transactions may prompt investors to reduce their short-term holdings
of a currency and increase their longer-term holdings. If an investor has a long-term interest
in the sustained value of the currency, he is less likely to benefit from its near-term deprecia-
tion.").
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of the tax in that case. The primary impact would be on the short-term
speculator who uses hedge funds in hopes of turning a quick profit.""2
Some economists have argued that strong efficiency arguments can
be made in favor of a modest transactions tax to slow down the financial
markets, adding that these "efficiency benefits from curbing speculation are
likely to exceed any costs of reduced liquidity or increased costs of capital
that come from taxing transactions more heavily." 93 Expressing serious
reservations that "investments made with a horizon of hours reveal much
socially beneficial information to the market place," in contradistinction
to information supplied by investors with long-term investment strategies
that helps in determining the fundamental values of assets, they view a
transaction tax as "a natural policy for alleviating this market failure."
' 4
The anticipated effect is a restoration of needed balance in the market
by drowning or driving out "noise traders" (who do not trade on the basis
of sound information or reasonable prediction)9 because the tax "would
have a significant impact in making it less attractive to invest resources in
various short-term prediction activities, since the tax cost would increase
with the frequency of trading. '96
In" addition, a transaction tax may also increase economic efficiency
if it succeeds in discouraging purely rent-seeking speculative behavior,
which diverts resources to "treasure hunting" instead of devotion to
genuinely productive activities that benefit society.97 Noting that excessive
expenditures are deployed toward information gathering and financial
innovation, Nobel Economics Laureate Joseph Stiglitz argues that,
inasmuch as the tax will discourage the disproportionate expenditures
devoted to this form of "rent-seeking," it serves to promote economic
efficiency.98 "It can thus be viewed as a special and potentially important
case of a Pigovian corrective tax, a tax that improves economic efficiency at
the same time that it raises revenues. ' 9
A transaction tax is also expected to address the twin manifestations of
investor short-termism. First, it could lengthen the investment horizons
92 Carrasco & Berg, supra note 84, at 744.
93 Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P Summers, When FinancialMarkets Work Too Well: A
Cautious Casefora Securities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. z6i, 263 (1989).
94 Id. at 272.
95 See Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Curefor "Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L. REv. 713, 718-19
(1995) (describing noise tradirfg, its participants and effects); Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal
Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044,
io8i (2005) (stating that noise trading leads to market inefficiency).
96 Summers & Summers, supra note 93, at 272.
97 See John Karl Scholz, Comments on "Adverse Implications of a Securities Transactions Excise
Tax" by Joseph A. Grundfest and John B. Shoven, 6. J. AccT., AUDITING & FIN. 443,444 (1991 ).
98 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN.
SERVICES RES. 101, 103 (1989).
99 Id.
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of corporate managers."° By driving out those investors whose irrationality
poses a stumbling block to looking beyond the immediate situation,
companies would be more tolerant of investments with long-term payoffs
but which lead to reductions in quarterly earnings. 101 Also, when investors
pursue an investment strategy that consistently consists of holding stock
for a longer period of time, it sends a signal to management that it is free
to pursue more long-term strategies.' Secondly, "transaction taxes that tie
shareholders to firms may induce shareholders to take a more active role in
monitoring management and insuring that proper planning and investment
activities take place." 103 Thus, transaction taxes aim to replace shareholder
exit with shareholder voice on the assumption that since the cost of exit is
significantly raised by the tax, dissatisfied shareholders, instead of leaving
for other companies, would be impelled to stay and seek avenues to
influence or displace the management of their companies. 104
Some scholars have found evidence that a transaction tax would drive
down speculation' 10 Supporters of a transactions tax also suggest that it
will reduce volatility by decreasing trading. 1°6 This will be beneficial to
investors and firms. According to Stiglitz, "to the extent that volatility
would be reduced, the buyer of the security bears less risk concerning the
price he or she will receive when he or she sells it. Thus, reducing the
volatility will make it easier for firms to raise equity capital."'' 07 A secondary
Io Id. at 109 (stating that unlike the case of short-term speculators, the effect of the tax
on an investor who plans to hold stock for 20 years is negligible; and if the tax thereby leads
to an increase in the number of long-term investors, corporate managers, freed from pressure
from short-term oriented investors, would direct their attention toward the long term).
ioi Summers & Summers, supra note 93, at 273.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 273-74; see also Rend M. Stulz, Comment, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EQ-
UITY MARKETS 303, 304 (Jeffrey Frankel ed. 1994) (stating that when trading is cheap, inves-
tors may sell their stock if dissatisfied with management, but if the cost of trading increases,
"investors become locked into their holdings and can increase the performance of their port-
folios through actions designed to improve the performance of management.... [and that be-
cause transactions taxes] increase the cost of trading, this reasoning implies that they increase
the monitoring of management and hence improve corporate performance")
105 John Y. Campbell & Kenneth A. Froot, International Experiences with Securities Trans-
action Taxes, in 'ME INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EQUITY MARKETS, supra note Io4, at 277, 296 (
showing from case studies that investor response to transactions taxes could take the form of
a reduction in the volume of taxable transactions, adding that "some econometric evidence
for this behavior" also exists).
Io6 See Stulz, supra note 104, at 305.
107 Stiglitz, supra note 98, at Io8.
20II-2OI[21
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
benefit of a transaction tax is the substantial amount of tax revenue that it
would generate."' 8
C. Arguments Against a Securities Transaction Tax
Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments in support of a securities
transaction tax, pertinent questions pertaining to the viability, efficacy and
acceptability of this type of tax in the context of short term stock trading still
persist. The tax proposal confronts the natural hostility of corporate finance
to regulation of financial capital, as exemplified by the strong opposition
to the imposition of a Tobin tax on the withdrawal by foreign investors of
investments in national stock or money markets."° Opposition from the
securities industry also marked and marred a planned introduction of a
Securities Transaction Excise Tax as part of the 1990 budget negotiations.110
More substantively, some of the assumptions behind the tax may be
overly optimistic. One example is investor monitoring of managerial
behavior. Even supporters of the tax doubt its efficacy in pushing
shareholders along those lines, in view of the free rider problem."'
Shareholders evince a legendary reluctance to engage alone in causes that
would redound to the benefit of all."' Similarly, a shareholder would prefer
to wait for other shareholders to take charge of the battle, while she lurks
in the sidelines, convinced that she cannot be excluded from its benefits
that accrue to all. 1 3 In addition "for investors who can find ways to alter the
io8 See Scholz, supra note 97, at 443.
109 Schwartz, supra note 91, at I Io8.
1io See Joseph A. Grundfest & John B. Shoven, Adoerse Implications of a Securities Transac-
tions Excise Tax, 6 J. AccT., AUDITING. & FIN. 409, 410 (1991) (discussing the opposition from
various quarters, including the securities and commodities industries, pension fund managers
and investors, that trailed a planned adoption of a Securities Transactions Excise Tax (STET)
as part of the 199o budget, and which scuttled the plan); Stout, Casinos, supra note 76, at
699-700; see also Sanford M. Jacoby, Employee Representation and Corporate Governance: A Missing
Link, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 484 (2ooI); Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, How Many
Cheers for the Tobin Transactions Tax?, 21 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 753, 765-66 (1997) (outlining the
obstacles to a transactions tax); cf. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 226-28 (2d ed.
2005) ("In the interest of longer-run economic stability, it may be that the best stabilizing
influence on markets is to broaden them to allow as many people as possible to trade as often
as possible.").
I I I Summers & Summers, supra note 93, at 273-74; Stout, Casinos, supra note 76, at 687.
112 See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv.
10, 12 (1991).
113 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 89, 95 (1985). See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids,
the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, II BELL J. ECON. 42 (198o) (arguing
that the free-rider problem makes it unprofitable for small shareholders to undertake the task
of monitoring management).
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return distribution of their portfolios without paying the tax, the tax affects
how these investors trade but not how they monitor management." 114
Besides, while the tax has the potential to be a force for good, it also
carries with it enormous potential to inflict harm. A valid concern is that
a transaction tax may "reduce market liquidity, which may discourage
investment and increase the risks borne by the owners of capital." "'Assume
that for some reason, a large block of shares of a particular company became
available for sale on the exchange. Some investors want to purchase the
block, but want a slight price drop as concession. Investors that play this
role, enabling such trades to take place, provide liquidity to. the markets.
As such, the service they provide is an important one. Yet, their intention
may not to be to hold on to these shares for a long time. 16 A transaction
tax makes such market moves more difficult as the investors providing
the liquidity would factor the tax amount into the acceptable price they
are willing to pay for the stock to account for the decrease in their profit
occasioned by the tax.'17
Some commentators also vehemently oppose the tax on the basis that
it "would represent-a return to the 'bad old days' when politicians and
bureaucrats attempted to use taxation to achieve a myriad of worthwhile
and not-so-worthwhile non-revenue objectives" adding that the proper
role of tax law is to raise revenue, and not a vehicle for accomplishing
non-revenue policy goals."' It is logical to assume that because the Rich
114 Stulz, supra note 104, at 304.
1 I5 Summers & Summers, supra note 93, at 274. The scholars respond by arguing that
"beyond a certain point, increased liquidity may have costs that exceed its benefits" and that
"transactions taxes are in place with respect to most of the world stock markets, and have ap-
parently not reduced liquidity sufficiently to create severe problems." Id.
116 Stulz, supra note 104, at 306; Mitchell, Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 46, at 1209 ("[S]
pecialists, market makers and day traders make significant profits by short-term trading, and
in so doing they may help to move market prices in the 'right' direction.")
117 Stulz, supra note 104, at 306. For additional discussion of the importance of liquidity,
see Stout, Casinos, supra note 76, at 683-84. According to Stout,
Speculative trading can contribute to market liquidity by increasing both the
number of traders and the frequency of trading in the market. Liquid secondary
markets, in turn, are thought to provide a social benefit by encouraging capital in-
vestment. Because investors desire liquidity, they value assets that can be quickly
resold more highly than assets that are difficult to convert into cash. The promise
of a liquid secondary market is thought to encourage investors to purchase newly
issued stocks, lowering firms' cost of capital.
Id. For a discussion of the effect on liquidity in the currency context, see Terrill, supra note
91, at 311 ("Transaction taxes like these often result in reduced liquidity in the domestic cur-
rency market and unwanted decreases in overall capital inflows."); see also Barry Eichengreen,
Conclusion: The Tobin Tax: What Have We Learned, in TiE TOBIN Tx: COPING WITH FINANCIAL
VOLATILITY 273, 274 (Mahbub ul Haq et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the importance of specula-
tion in providing currency market stability).
118 Douglas M. Branson, Book Review, Lawrence E. Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility -
America's Newest Export (Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 2001), 65 U. PITr. L. REV.
911, 928 (2004); see also Thompson, supra note 87, at 402 ("Revenue production must be the
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constitute a sizeable portion of the investor group, the transaction tax
will be a progressive tax, with favorable distributive consequences for
the Poor. But the tax may actually be regressive in that the burden would
substantially fall on the largely middle class beneficiaries of private pension
funds and state and local taxpayers who would be asked to make up any
shortfall in the assets of public pension plans resulting from the higher
transaction costs.Y
9
Another source of objection is that the transactions tax is not limited
to trades that take place when stock prices change rapidly. Instead, it
would tax every trade, including trades that occur when there is minimal
or zero volatility, and thus is likely to inflict enormous costs on society.2 0
Generally, it ensnares and imposes hardship on investors that have virtually
no contribution to the speculation problem that it is designed to curb.'
These include innocent shareholders who want to sell their stock to meet
other financial needs and who have no interest in speculation of any kind. 2 1
Thus, the question arises: why not explore alternative policy proposals to
target undesirable practices without inflicting harm on those who are not
the source of the problem?2 3
Another weakness of the proposed tax is that it will present substantial
difficulties of administration, implementation, and compliance. 4 Close
substitutes of covered instruments and traditional trading patterns will
emerge to avoid the tax.' If the proposal is implemented only in the
United States, there is a legitimate concern that the tax will drive investors
quintessential purpose of taxation."). But see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxa-
tion, 60 TAx L. REv. i, 3-4 (2006) (stating that taxation serves three functions, namely to raise
revenue, to redistribute wealth in order to reduce inequality in the society, and to regulate
private economic activity, steering it in the direction that the government desires); Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax and Other Regulatory
Taxes 1-2 (Univ. of Mich., Empirical Legal Studies Ctr.,Working Paper Series 21, 201o),avail-
able at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=t 131 &context=umichlwps (outlin-
ing the three goals of taxation).
i 19 Grundfest & Shoven, supra note 1 io, at 411.
120 Id.
121 See Stiglitz, supra note 98, at ioz (conceding that "[clhanges in economic circum-
stances may lead 'individuals to wish to change their portfolios, entailing selling some se-
curities and buying others," but noting that such transactions do not constitute the bulk of
short-term trading).
122 See Carrasco & Berg, supra note 84, at 745 (noting that one of the criticisms of the
Tobin tax is that "introduces inefficiencies and does not distinguish between 'good' specula-
tion and 'bad' speculation").
123 See Mahoney, supra note 95, at 726 ("Even if we assume the existence of noise trad-
ers, we should still prefer policy approaches that will minimize unnecessary harm to those
market participants who are not noise traders.")
i 24 See Grundfest & Shoven, supra note I o, at 423-26.
125 See id. at 423; see also Carrasco & Berg, supra note 84, at 745.
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bent on avoiding the tax to other financial centers. 126 The fact that a
number of industrialized countries already have some form of a financial
transactions tax, however, weakens the force of this charge.1 27 The tax may
also be harmonized with other financial center countries to avoid an exodus
of trading activities to those countries.""8
Despite the issues raised above, the objection retains considerable
force. Even if major financial centers agree to coordinate efforts in this
regard, some tax-haven countries will seize the opportunity to divert a
good volume of business to themselves.2 9 Some of the problems may be
cushioned by exempting transactions by foreign participants in the United
States from the tax.130 However, that would only lead to the devising of
various innovative vehicles to circumvent the levy; for instance, by United
States citizens trading with shell entities incorporated in other countries.1'
Similarly, if the tax is structured to tax Americans regardless of where the
trading takes place as a way to counter the offshore havens problem,1 31
Americans can avoid the problem by trading through foreign vehicles.13
In light of the foregoing, the revenue-raising potential may be over-
estimated, especially as investors devise means of avoiding it or modify
their trading behavior. 134
Because it would be more cost-effective for large investors to pay for
avoidance strategies than it is for small investors, it follows that relative to
126 Carrasco & Berg, supra note 84, at 745; see also Summers & Summers, supra note
93, at 280 (discussing opposition to a transactions tax based on the reasoning that "such a tax
would cripple the United States securities industry by driving much of the activity of the U.S.
financial markets offshore"); Campbell & Froot, supra note 105, at 278, 292.
127 See Chaka Fattah, Deja' Vu All Over Again: Reexamining Fundamental Tax Reform and
Evaluating the Feasibility of a Transaction Tax in the ln ith Congress, 47 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 327,353,
355 (2010) (stating that some or other form of transaction tax exists in a number of countries);
Jeffrey Frankel, Why Not a Transaction Tax?, SEEKING ALPHA (Sept. 30, zoo8), http://seekingal-
pha.com/article/97964-why-not-a-transaction-tax (stating that a "lot of countries already
have such transactions taxes."); see also Summers & Summers, supra note 93, at 28o ("[F]ears
regarding a drastic reduction in the size of the U.S. securities industry are unwarranted.")
128 Summers & Summers, supra note 93, at 28o; see also Frankel, supra note 127 (stating
that a lot of countries "would love to cooperate with the United States in an international
program to harmonize such taxes internationally," adding that it "is precisely the sort of thing
that many abroad have always asked Americans to participate in, but that we have not hitherto
wanted to do")
129 See Summers & Summers, supra note 93, at z8o.
130 Id.
131 See Grundfest & Shoven, supra note Io, at 432 (noting that exempting foreigners
from the tax would "create an incentive for U.S. investors to acquire interests in foreign capital
pools able to trade free of the [transactions tax's] burdens").
132 See Summers & Summers, supra note 93, at 28o.
133 Cf Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 409-10 (1992) (discussing devices to avoid regulatory require-
ments).
134 See Campbell & Froot, supra note 1o5, at 28o.
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large investors, the tax may penalize small investors who either pay the
tax or are locked into their holdings. If large investors are able to sell their
holdings almost as easily as they would before the tax, thereby availing
themselves of the Wall Street Rule, the objective of keeping management
from paying attention to short-run performance at the expense of long-
run performance is largely defeated; the tax only succeeds in reducing the
use of the rule by small investors. The implications are significant: "[t]
ypically, those who are concerned about short-termism tend to blame fund
managers rather than small shareholders, so it is difficult to believe that
[transaction taxes] do much about short-termism."'13
While one of the primary objectives of a transaction tax is the reduction
of volatility, proponents and antagonists alike acknowledge that it may
not be an effective tool in accomplishing that task.136 A recent empirical
study of eight historical events where regulators increased transaction
costs at times of financial crisis or major price corrections reveals that lower
volatility, decreased trading volume, or plunge in prices did not accompany
the introduction of higher costs.137
Finally, a transaction tax also has a paternalistic aspect to it. The
assumption is that investors basing their trading on "noise" harm themselves
and the society. Proponents of the tax, therefore, seek to offer them
imperial protection: "[i]f we systematically use our freedom to buy and sell
financial assets to our own disadvantage, it would be better for a wise and
sympathetic central authority to limit that freedom."'38 Skeptics scoff at this
notion, observing that proponents bear a heavy burden in demonstrating a
sound basis for "prohibiting or deterring voluntary commercial transactions
135 Stulz, supra note 104, at 305 (footnote omitted).
136 Grundfest & Shoven, supra note I o, at 411 ("Available evidence based on experi-
ence during the 1987 market crash, as well as on Sweden's experience with a transactions tax,
also suggest that transaction taxes do not reduce market volatility."). A supporter of the tax,
Professor Jeffrey Frankel, notes: "The historical experience with small taxes seems to be that
there is no discernible effect on volatility. In some cases the volume of trading within the
country is affected. But what the tax does usually do is raise a lot of money." Frankel, supra
note 127. Professor Frankel nonetheless endorses it because of this revenue-raising potential.
Id.; see also Kiefer, supra note 63, at 890 (noting that empirical evidence indicates that a trans-
fer tax that reduces trading "would not affect volatility one way or the other"). But see Richard
Roll, Price Volatility, International Market Links, and Their Implications for Regulatory Policies, 3 J.
FIN. SERVIcEs. REs. 211, 233-41 (1989). See generally Daniel B. Nelson, Commentary: Price Vola-
tility, International Market Links, and Their Implications for Regulatory Policies, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES
RES. 247 ( 1989) (presenting a critique of Roll's article).
137 Lynn Bai &-Rujing Meng, Deterring "Double-Play" Manipulation In Financial Crisis:
Increasing Transaction Cost as a Regulatory Tool, 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 137, 163-64
(2009).
138 Mahoney, supra note 95, at 714.
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between reasonably sophisticated parties who have ample alternatives and
substantial access to relevant information."139
III. CAPITAL GAINS TAx
A. Preliminary Points
The treatment of capital gains has been described as "a contentious
question that appears to be a permanent fixture of tax policy debates.""14
The recurring question on what role capital gains tax rates should play in
the short-termism debate clearly bears out this observation. The U.S. policy
regarding taxation of ordinary income and capital gains has been causally
linked to short-termism.41 Tax policy changes from the 1970s drastically
reduced the differential between income tax and capital gains tax, thereby
practically minimizing the incentive to hold stocks for the long term. 4
Prior to these changes, investors were constrained to hold their stock for a
longer period or risk the alternative of paying taxes on realized gains at the
top marginal rate of 75 percent. 43
Seeing that the capital gains tax policy can affect investment behavior,
reform advocates consider higher taxes on profits from short-term
investing as one of the tools that could be deployed to slow down investor
short-termism. 144 Capital gains tax reform could take a number of forms.
One approach is to increase the applicable income tax rate for short-term
capital gains from approximately 35 percent (for individuals and investing
institutions with a high net worth) to a higher rate. 14 Alternatively, the
long-term rate could be decreased from the current rate of 15 percent."4
Reform may also be approached by increasing the short-term period
139 Id.; see also Kiefer, supra note 63, at 896 (arguing that taxes that discourage trading
are inconsistent with the reasoning in economics that any activity that the actors are willing
to pay for is valuable).
14o George R. Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation: Realizations, Revenues,
Efficiency and Equity, 48 TAx L. REV. 419, 421 (1993).
141 See TONELLO, supra note 30, at 6.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Kelly & White, supra note 12, at 772; see also ASPEN INST., supra note 18, at 3 (recom-
mending a sliding scale capital gains tax reform "designed to discourage excessive share trad-
ing and encourage longer-term share ownership").
145 The government taxes short-term capital gains as ordinary income. See I.R.C. § I
(West 2011 ); see also Gabaldon, Euphoric Market, supra note 87, at 281 (advocating "increasing
rates on extremely short-term gains" to regulate stock trading behavior); Lowenstein, supra
note 26, at 12 (discussing a proposal to impose a one hundred percent tax on short term capital
gains).
146 I.R.C. § i.
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from 12 months to 24 months or more.'47 Another approach that may be
employed is a sliding-scale provision under which gains from short-term
sales of stock are taxed at a high rate, but the rate decreases the longer the
stocks are held by the owner ("holding period") prior to the sale. 4s Instead
of having two rates - short term and long term - what it would obtain is a
steady decline in rates over time, "stretching beyond the one-year point
that is presently the lowest rate at the federal level."' 149
B. Arguments in Favor of Capital Gains Tax Reform
The idea behind the capital gains tax reform proposal is to punish short
term trading and encourage long term holding.5 0 Discussing the sliding
scale form of capital gains tax, prominent corporate lawyer, Martin Lipton,
poses the following argument:
The graduated tax would help shift the focus of institutional
investors from the short to the long term, thereby harnessing
the energy of a powerful group of professionals for improved
corporate governance. A longer-term perspective will encourage
institutional investors to bridge the gap between ownership and
control by monitoring the ability of management to achieve
the valuable long-term goals of expanding the enterprise and
improving productivity. This focus, in turn, will increase the
long-term value of corporate equity.'5'
A fairly recent call for an extension of the short term capital gains
tax period to two years and imposition of a securities transaction tax was
rationalized on the grounds that these changes will raise revenues and give a
comparative advantage to those stockholders who operate as real investors,
147 If an asset is held for one year or less, the gain from its sale is classified as short-term.
If it is held for longer than one year, the gain is classified as long-term. See id. § 1222(3); see also
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of
Managers andLaborin a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 1. CORP. L. 1, 18 (2007)
[hereinafter Strine, Toward Common Sense] (advocating an increase in the short-term period to
two years as a way of encouraging long term investing).
148 Aleta G. Estreicher, BeyondAgency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45
RUTGERS L. REV. 513,601 (1993); see also Should the Government Promote or Protect New Technolo-
gies?, FALL KAN. J. L. & PuB. PoL'y, Fall 1994, at 37, 42 (Chimerine); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS: PUBLICATION 544, at 33 (2oo6) (defining holding
period).
149 Jacoby, supra note 1 O, at 484 (zooi); see also Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance
in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 64 (1987) [hereinafter Lipton, Finance
Corporatism] (suggesting the implementation of a graduated tax).
150 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Business and Short Termism - Why Investor Taxation is the Solu-
tion, ETHICAL CORP. (Aug. I I 2oo6), http:llwww.ethicalcorp.com/content/business-and-short-
termism-why-investor-taxation-solution [hereinafter, Mitchell, Investor Taxation].
151 Lipton, Finance Corporatism, supra note 149, at 64.
[Vol. I00
SHORT-TERMISM & MYOPIA
as opposed to those who behave like gamblers.' Similarly, since a capital
gains tax is expected to reduce liquidity, it is considered an antidote to the
tendency of some shareholders to exit the firm easily and, by extension; a
device to encourage long-term investing.' s3 One commentator confidently
posits that a higher tax on capital gains based on length of holding "would
work dramatic behavioral changes in securities markets, especially among
short-term speculators such as arbitrageurs.
'' 4
C. Arguments Against Higher Capital Gains Tax
First, in response to the immediately preceding point in support ofh igher
capital gains tax for some short-term investors, the idea that arbitrageurs
are bad and need to be inhibited in their work is open to question. 55 In
fact, one argument against securities and capital gains taxes is that such
taxes would impose additional costs on arbitrageurs, who by nature are also
short-term speculators, thereby deterring them from correcting mispricings
of stocks. 156
Not surprisingly, the proposed capital gains tax reform has attracted a
number of strong criticisms. One commentator notes that the reduction
of the capital gains tax rate in 2003 had the salutary effect of improving
liquidity in the market, while doubling capital gains revenues for the
federal government from $269 billion in 2002 to $539 billion in 2005.'
152 Strine, Toward Common Sensi, supra note 147, at 18.
153 See Estreicher, supra note 148, at 6oo-oi.
154 Id. at 6oi.
155 See Erik F Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market Approach to
Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 977, 981 ("Economic and legal scholars have
long seen arbitrage as a cure for speculative mispricings and as a means to short-circuit as-
set-price bubbles," leading to successful calls for removal of federal securities regulation that
hampered short sales) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 981 n.12 ("Arbitrage means invest-
ment trades that exploit a perceived short-term mispricing of an asset. For example, if an
arbitrageur believes a certain stock is overvalued, he or she sells that stock short (i.e., borrows
shares of that stock and then sells them). The arbitrageur profits if the stock price declines
from the amount owed the lender of the stock (but loses if the price rises). Arbitrageurs hedge
their risks when entering into short sales by simultaneously buying a close substitute of the
stock.").
156 Id. at 1027; see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The New Theory of the Firm:
Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, AM. ECON. REv., May 199o, at 148, 148-53
(199o), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/equilibrium.pdf
(stating that the "short horizons of arbitrageurs lead to short horizons of corporate manag-
ers" but also adding that "[airbitrage generally serves the useful social function of bringing
asset prices closer to fundamental values"). See generally Jeremy C. Stein, PresidentialAddress:
Sophisticated Investors and Market Efficiency, 64 J. FIN. 1517 (2oo9), available at http://www.eco-
nomics.harvard.edu/faculty/stein/files/presidential-address-jf-final.pdf (noting the difficulty
in determining whether arbitrage contributes to greater market efficiency).
157 John F. Olson, Reflections on a Visit to Leo Strines Peaceable Kingdom, 33 J. CORP. L. 73,
79 (2007).
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Moreover, there is the concern that using negative tax consequences to deter-
investors from selling their positions amounts to artificially interfering with
market discipline instead of allowing companies with good management
to prosper."5 8
• Using a preferential rate for capital gains relative to income tax to
encourage long-term investing on the expectation that it would in turn
engender a long-term perspective by management has been assailed; the
view is that it would be ineffective regardless of whether investors behave
rationally or irrationally."9 In a stock market in which investors behave
rationally, every stockholder, including one that trades with a short-term
horizon, has a vested interest in seeing management maximize long-term
profits on the understanding that a high price for any company's stock can
hardly exist if buyers do not believe that the company's prospects for long-
run profitability are good. 60 Conversely, irrational investors, by definition,
are unlikely to take advantage of the capital gains preference to invest
long-term. 161
Higher capital gains tax for short-term trading and the resulting decrease
in liquidity raise some concerns, particularly as it compels investors whose
securities have appreciated in value to hold on to securities for a little longer
to satisfy the long-term requirement, even when they know that the price
will fall during the remainder of the holding period. 16 Essentially, investors
are given an incentive to hold on to less profitable assets. Not only are
older investments that are no longer as profitable as newer opportunities
kept longer, the ability of newer investments to attract capital is reduced,
perhaps to a suboptimal level. 63'
Such a tax, as with the securities tax, also runs into the additional
objection that it punishes innocent short-term investors who are selling
because their economic position, rather than market speculation, so dictates.
i58 Id.
159 James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests,
19 CARDozo L. REv. 697, 713-14 (1997) [hereinafter Repetti, Tax Incentives].
16o Id.; see also Black, Watching Agents, supra note 24, at 863 ("In a reasonably efficient
capital market, even an investor who plans to sell next month must care about long-term
value, because buyers will have a longer horizon.").
161 Repetti, Tax Incentives, supra note 159, at 714; James R. Repetti, Long-Term Capital
Gains, the Long-Term Investment Perspective, and Corporate Productivity, 49 TAx NOTES 85, 90- 91
(1990) ("[I]f the market is in fact controlled by irrational investors, then holding period re-
quirements will be ineffective...."); Repetti, Tax Law, supra note 3o, at 627-30.
16z See Mark L. Louie, Note, Realizing Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capi-
tal Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN. L. REv. 857, 872 n.64 (1982).
163 Id. at 864. The effect is similar to the "lock-in" phenomenon. Id. at 872 n.64. The
phenomenon, considered the most potent argument against capital gains taxation, refers to
the tendency of investors to defer the sale of appreciated assets since no taxes are due until
they realize the gains from the assets, consequently depriving themselves of needed cash or
ability to take advantage of available investment opportunities. See id. at 864; David Carris,
Capital Gains Taxation: A Full Circle? 14 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 53-54 (1989).
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One advocate of taxing short-term capital gains at a higher rate tempers the
call with a suggestion for exemption of some short-term trades, including
those executed by market makers and exchange specialists.164 Sale of
stocks when holders are left with no option, an example of which is a forced
sale following a merger, might also be excluded from the tax. 16 Another
proponent suggests addressing the injustice by granting exemptions to
those who demonstrate that economic hardship compelled them to sell."6
The burdens that such a demonstration would impose on investors and the
implementation challenges that it would pose for bureaucrats lessen the
palatability of the proposal. In summary, there is little to inspire confidence
that the transaction and capital gains taxes will accomplish the stated
objectives. 67
IV. LOYALTY DIVIDEND
A. Preliminary Points
Dividends are distributions made to shareholders qua shareholders out
of the corporation's surplus or net profits." It is a basic way for shareholders
164 Estreicher, supra note 148, at 6oI.
165 See id.
166 Mitchell, Investor Taxation, supra note 150.
167 One commentator explains as follows:
An array of evidence suggests that transaction and capital-gains taxes will have
mixed results in preventing bubbles. In one experimental asset market, a mod-
erate transaction tax did not eliminate bubbles or reduce their duration, but it
did reduce the amplitude of a bubble. Oddly, this transaction tax increased the
turnover of shares for traders inexperienced with the experiments. In another ex-
periment, a fifty-percent--capital-gains tax likewise did not reduce the tendency
of bubbles to occur.
This experimental evidence accords with the observation by one economist
that real-estate markets, which have higher transaction costs than stock markets,
still experience bubbles. Moreover, countries that impose higher transaction costs
on trades do not seem to enjoy less stock-market volatility. Of course, at a high-
enough rate, transaction taxes will deter speculation but at the potential cost of
choking-off liquidity in the market.
Gerding, supra note 155, at IO26-27 (footnotes omitted).
168 See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 153 (2000) ("'Dividends' is the com-
mon term for distributions from a corporation to its shareholders by virtue of their position
as shareholders."); 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 36o (2011) ("The term 'dividend,' as applied to
corporate stock, may be defined as that portion of the profits and surplus funds of a corporation
which has been actually set apart, by a valid act of the corporation, for distribution among the
stockholders according to their respective interests, in such a sense as to become segregated
from the property of the corporation, and to become the property of the stockholders distribu-
tively. The term 'dividend' may, more simply, be defined as a payment to stockholders as a re-
turn upon their investment." (footnotes omitted)); see also Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corpo-
rate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, I BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 26 n.89 (2004) ("Dividends
may only be paid out of surplus, or if there is no surplus, out of net profits for the most recent
two fiscal years, but any decision to pay dividends is solely the prerogative of directors.").
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to get a return on their investment.'69 Nonetheless, shareholders are not
entitled to dividend payments unless the Board declares them. 70 Therefore,
barring exceptional circumstances,' the declaration of dividends is
entirely at the discretion of the directors. 7 The proposed loyalty dividends
are additional to the regular dividends that shareholders receive when
declared by the Board.'73 Accordingly, the loyalty dividends would not be
declared without a prior declaration of the regular dividends.'74
A prominent proponent of loyalty dividends, Peter Butler, has
described the loyalty dividend as probably the most interesting proposal
for redressing the balance between short-termism and long-run value. 7
He explains that the dividends would go only to those stockholders who do
not sell or lend their stock for a stated period. 7 6 Directors would propose
the dividends through a resolution at the company's annual meeting,
ensuring that it is of sufficient size to accomplish its goal without creating
169 Douglas K. Moll Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close Corporation, 6o
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 842 (2003) ("The receipt of a dividend is perhaps the most basic
method by which a shareholder earns a return on her investment in a corporation.").
17o Blair, supra note i68, at 26 n.89 ("Under case law dating back to 1868, shareholders
have not had the legal right to receive any dividend at all unless it was declared by directors.").
i 1 There are several examples of exceptional circumstances, namely, where there have
been huge accumulations of profits. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 17o N.W. 668, 685
(Mich. 1919) (affirming lower court's decree requiring distribution of a special dividend and
holding board of directors refusal to declare extra dividends was arbitrary where a substantial
surplus remained after paying approved plant expansion and improvement costs and very
large annual profits were reasonably expected); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692, 695
(Sup. Ct. 1947) (stating the principle that when an adequate surplus is available, directors
must not act in bad faith in failing to pay dividends); Patton v. Nicholas, 279 S.W.zd 848,853-
54 (Tex. 1955) (holding minority shareholders entitled to remedy for "malicious suppression
of dividends" when, in the face of substantial surplus accumulation, the majority shareholder
exercised control over the board to prevent any dividends being paid with the intention of
lowering the market value of minority shares).
172 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dirjidend Poliy, 67 VA. L. REv. 699,
700 (I981) ("[Clurrent legal rules giving management virtually unlimited discretion in mak-
ing the dividend decision maximize shareholder welfare [in public corporations].").
173 See, e.g., Notice of Meeting Constituting Notice of Convocation to the Shareholders
of Lafarge 1-3 (Mar. 29, 2oio), http:llwww.lafarge.com/032920o-publication-finance-
BALO_AGO_zoio-uk.pdf (proposing, for the 2010 Ordinary Shareholders Meeting, a regular
dividend of 2 Euros per share and a loyalty dividend of 2.2 Euros per share).
174 See Aaron Gray-Block, DSM Loyalty Div Scheme Wins Backingfrom European Corporate
Governance Watchdog, ABC MONEY (United Kingdom), Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.abcmoney.
co.uk/news/14200739202.htm (noting that a proposed loyalty dividend would not be at the
expense of regular dividends).
175 Peter Butler, Chief Executive, Governance for Owners, Address to the ICGN An-
nual Conference in Washington 5 (July zoo6), http:llwww.governanceforowners.com/gossl
think-piece/2oo6 (follow "Peter Butler's address to the ICGN Annual Conference in Wash-
ington Hedge funds - Download PDF" hyperlink).
176 Id.
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additional problems for the company or shareholders.'77 The rationale for
the loyalty dividend, according to Butler, is as financial inducement to
enable shareholders to defray the extensive cost associated with the proper
exercise of their "democratic" responsibilities within the corporation. 7
Unfortunately, these costs are likely to be borne only by long-term
holders, as opposed to most short-term investors who, by the nature of
their temporal commitment, lack an interest in such responsibilities.'79 The
"extra dividend would be a payment for loyalty and would help to off-set
the additional costs of being a responsible long-term owner. A dividend
differential of less than 5%, say 10-15 basis points, would be sufficient to
change behaviour in the market."'' 80
B. Arguments in Favor of Loyalty Dividends
Scholars have argued that regular dividends help bridge the monitoring
gap, because the expectation of dividends provides an incentive for
shareholders to engage in more frequent and effective monitoring of
managerial conduct'' Afortiori, shareholders who expect an extra dividend
may be galvanized to keep a close eye on management to ensure that the
corporation is managed in way that ensures maximization of long-run
value, given that it is the only way to assure continued payment of the
loyalty dividends.
The notion that stockholders generally reserve no loyalty for the
companies whose stock they hold is well-founded.' 2 This observation is
even truer in the case of short-term shareholders whose primary focus on
immediate gains leads to a weakened attachment to their companies. A
loyalty dividend is a way of rewarding those shareholders that have evinced
an appreciable level of loyalty, while encouraging other shareholders
to make a similar demonstration. Apart from serving to incentivize
shareholders to keep their shares for a longer term, loyalty dividends also
aim to improve investor relations by creating an opportunity for more
direct communication between shareholders and the firm's management.' 3
Accordingly, these dividends could be viewed as a subsidy to promote the
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See id.
I8o Id.
181 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 14.1, at 598-600 (1986).
182 Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARv. L. & PoL'Y
REv. I, 9 (2008); see also Homer Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and thi Real Issues, 36
Bus. LAw. 173, 177 (i98i) (stating that the average shareholder sees himself as an investor
"free to move into and out of the corporation without loyalty...").
183 PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES, TRIDOS BANK 3 (2OIo), available at http://www.triodos.
comldownloads/research/proxyvoting.guidelines2o I o.pdf.
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engagement of long-term shareholders with the corporate management,
instead of "voting with their feet" when they disagree with the direction
of the corporation.184
While supporters of this proposal may see this subsidy as a justified fillip
to boost long-term shareholder activism, opponents may also justifiably
view it as tilting the shareholder playing field against hedge funds, which
are willing on their own to spend money to advance their goals.'8S Besides,
the dividends could be seen as a form of perverse incentive that motivates
shareholders to engage in actions without bearing the cost. As many
economists would preach, "parties bearing the full cost of their actions
make better decisions than those that do not.""' On the other hand, it
also follows that what gets compensated is what gets accomplished.'87
Thus, without the subsidy, long-term shareholders are unlikely to take the
needed steps, as current experience amply demonstrates. 8  Proponents
seem to be propelled by this recognition in making the case for loyalty
dividends.'89
The attractiveness of this proposal lies in the fact that it can be
implemented without recourse to the regulatory apparatus of the state.
Thus, companies may adopt it on their own initiative and structure it to
fit their particular circumstances.190 A partial explanation for the growing
interest in the concept of loyalty dividend is the opportunity it provides
management to have greater access to information relating to the ownership
of the company's stock. Usually, the introduction of the dividend requires
184 SeeThomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Em-
piricalAnalysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 712 (2007) ("The shareholder primacists' proposed solutions
to this problem are downright toxic to hedge funds. The main issue is that recently proposed
solutions amount to a subsidy for these other shareholders who either cannot or will not pay
their own way ......
I8S Id.
186 Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valued Mecha-
nism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 230 (200 1).
187 See N. Gregory Man kiw, Crisis Economics, NAT'L AFF., Summer 201o, at 2 1, 3o, avail-
able at http://nationalaffairs.com/doclib/2oioo614_MankiwWeb.pdf (stating that certain
"changes in incentives can influence behavior").
188 See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Em-
piricalAnalysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 710-I1 (2007) (stating that shareholders generally do not
have sufficient incentives to participate actively in corporate affairs); John Pound, The Rise
of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003,
1041-42 (1993) (stating that shareholders will monitor when it is in their economic interest
to do so). See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION &
PRIVATE PROPERTY (ioth ed. 2009) (examining the divorce of ownership and control in the
modern corporation).
189 See Butler, supra note 175, at 5.
19o Id. ("Different companies can experiment with a different framework."). This is very
important. As some scholars have noted, "to the extent short-termism generates a problem,
adaptive devices adopted by corporations are a better way to address it than regulation." Ka-
han & Rock, Hedge Funds, supra note 21, at 1027.
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the registration of shares with the company by participating shareholders.191
The insight that the company obtains in return for the loyalty dividends
provides it with advance notice of potential sources of threatening
maneuvers. According to some observers, the shareholding registration
requirement "would avoid situations of creeping control and enable
companies to have more direct contact with its investors - and know the
scale of investors' shareholdings more readily."19
C. Arguments Against Loyalty Dividends
The loyalty dividend is not without its fair share of criticisms. One
concern is that payment of extra dividends would shift resources from the
corporation to shareholders, such that the corporation may have to resort
to the capital 'markets to finance new ventures or expansion projects.193
So, it raises questions about whether or not the interests of shareholders
would be better served by having the corporation re-invest the funds and
create more value or whether the shareholders are sufficiently capable
of doing more with the funds than the company.91 However, strong
arguments support dividend payments because of the disciplining effect
it has on managers and the comparative advantage that it ultimately gives
shareholders vis-t-vis debt holders. 195
A particularly strong objection to a loyalty dividend is that its adoption
would undermine the principle of equal treatment of all similarly situated
shares. 96 Indeed, instituting loyalty dividends in some places or for certain
191 See HERMES INV. MGMT. LTD., POSITION PAPER: HERMES' APPROACH TO LOYALTY Divi-
DENDS 1 (201 1) (on file with author).
192 Id.
193 This argument has been raised in connection with regular dividends but applies,
perhaps with greater force, in the context of extra dividends like loyalty dividends. See Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Raceforthe Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. REv. 685,689 (2009).
194 "At the end of the day, you have to ask yourself, can you personally invest $7o billion
better than your stockholders." Robert A. Guth & Scott Thurm, Microsoft to Dole out Its-Cash
Hoard, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2004, at AI (quoting Jonathan Schwartz, then president of Sun
Microsystems); see also Victor Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REV. 85,
96-97 (1980) ("[Tlhere is evidence to suggest a systematic stockholder preference for indi-
vidual investor power to make the reinvestment decisions .... ); Marsha Cope Huie, Antitrust
and Corporate Dividend Policy: Revising Dividend Payment Policies to Empower Shareholders to
Curb Megers and Acquisitions, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 243,247 (1993) (criticizing the nondeclaration
of corporate stockholder dividends); cf. Daniel J. Morrissey, Another Look at the Law of Divi-
dends, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 449,486 (2006) ("When investors are denied dividends, however, the
analysis has to focus on their ultimate welfare. Will they be sufficiently compensated for their
privation by returns from the earning that their firm is reinvesting?").
195 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON.
REV. 650, 653, 655 (1984); Morrissey, supra note 194, at 48 1.
196 HERMES INV. MGMT. LTD., supra note 191, at I ("The fundamental argument against
such loyalty dividends is that they breach the principle of equality of rights and treatment
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companies'will require legislative changes.197 The equal treatment of
shares of the same class is considered a bedrock principle of American
corporate culture. 98 However, Delaware law only requires fair, but not
necessarily equal, treatment of all shares by the directors.199 Where there
is a corporate benefit behind the treatment, the fairness requirement
is satisfied. 00 An argument could be made that unequal treatment is
permissible in circumstances where the object is the protection of the
company and shareholders from serious damage by other shareholders.
It is not uncommon in an organizational setting, where the quick exit of
members increases the burden on the remaining members or otherwise
adversely affects the continued existence of the organization, to introduce
incentives to encourage long-term commitment, such .as senior pricing
discounts.2 0 It would appear that the loyalty dividend falls squarely in this
category.
Moreover, supporters would argue that the loyalty dividend is not
dissimilar from the bonuses and discounts that companies provide to their
long-term customers in appreciation of their loyalty."0 2 In any case, possible
between members of a single class of shares. In effect, those shareholders which invested in
the short-term or chose not to register their shares would be subsidising the investment of
others."); Cornelia Messing, DSM Faces Possible Action from Franklin Mutual over Loyalty Divi-
dend-Report, ABC MONEY, Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.abcmoney.co.uk/news/232oo728285.
htm#.
197 See, e.g., L. Reed Walton, 2oo8 Proxy Preview: Canada, ISS GOVERNANCE (Feb. 12,
zoo8, 11:41 AM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/gov/2oo8/02/zoo8-proxy-preview-canadasu-
bmitted-by-l-reed-walton-publications.html (stating that a loyalty dividend is not "possible
in actual practice as the law requires equal treatment of common shareholders of Canadian
banks.").
198 See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1207,
1I1 (zooz); Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 775
("Corporate law treats shares equally.").
I99 Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in Corporate
Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321,330 n.41 (zooi) ("Under the substantive law of Dela-
ware, corporate directors are free to discriminate among shares of the same class, including
minority held shares, because Delaware requires only 'fair' treatment, not 'equal' treatment
of shares." (citing Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993))); cf CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101
(West 1999 & Supp. 201 ) (prohibiting unequal treatment of shares of the same class).
200 SeeJames D. Cox, Equal Treatmentfor Shareholders: An Essay, 19 CAioozo L. REV. 615,
617(1997)-
201 Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Loyaly and Investment in Cooperatives 4-5 (Institut
D'1 conomie Industrielle, Working Paper, 2ooo), http://idei.fr/doc/by/rey/loyalty.pdf.
202 See Tom Powdrill, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Dividends), LABOUR & CAPITAL BLOG (Oct.
12, 2009), http://labourandcapital.blogspot.com/zoo9/lo/exit-voice-and-loyalty-dividends.
html.
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responses to the equal treatment objection include amending existing
corporate statutes and charters to accommodate loyalty dividends.
The loyalty dividend policy proposed by Dutch chemical company,
Royal DSM in early 2007, presents a useful case study.20 3 Under DSM's
loyalty dividend plan, shareholders register their shares and also furnish
additional details.2 04 Holding the shares continuously for 3 years, entitles
the shareholder to a 10% additional dividend.2 0 5 The policy was challenged
at the Dutch Enterprise Chamber by one of its shareholders, a hedge fund,
that argued that the loyalty dividend violates the equality of rights of all
shares under the Dutch Civil Code.2 06 The Enterprise Chamber agreed
with the hedge fund, but was overruled by the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands, which arrived at its decision without resolving the issue of the
legality of the loyalty dividend policy.2"7 Nevertheless, some commentators
agree with the argument of the Dutch Advocate General at the Supreme
Court that the policy should be upheld on the basis that, eventhough it
would result in differential treatment of similarly situated shareholders,
it is justified. 08 Dutch jurisprudence already permits deviation from the
equality principle if reasonable and objective grounds exist., According
to the Advocate General, such a ground exists when the objective of the
loyalty policy supersedes the short-term goals of shareholders.2 1
Notwithstanding the merits of the above proposals, it is unlikely that
they suffice as antidotes to short-termism. Because of the Wall Street Rule,
shareholders remain free to sell easily.21 What is needed is a critical mass of
shareholders that are firmly committed to holding a corporation's stock for
the long haul.2 12 However, the chances of getting that core of shareholders
203 Royal DSM N.V., Reasons and Structure for the Loyalty Dividend, (Dec. 19, 2oo6, 8:15
AM), http://www.dsm.com/enUS/cworld/public/media/pages/press-releases/63o6_dsm-
opens-pre-registration.jsp.
204 Id.; see also Ferdinand Mason .& Tim Carapiet, Loyalty Dividends: DSM and the Legal
Debate over Shareholder Incentives, IN-HousE LAW., 8o, May 2oo8, http://www.boekel.com/me-
dia/932 17/in-house%zolawyer%2omay%202oo8%2omason%2ocarapiet.pdf.
zo5 Mason & Carapiet, supra note 204.
206 Id. '
207 Id. at 8o-8I.
2o8 Id. at 81.
209 Id.
210 Id.; Ferdinand Mason and Tim Carapiet add that loyal shareholders can "serve as
a defensive tool against short term opportunism, as it requires a financial shareholder to be
rather creative to gain control over a company." Id.
21 ' See Lowenstein, supra note 26, at 12 (arguing that even a one hundred percent short
term capital gains tax will not overcome short-termism because of the Wall Street Rule).
212 See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Sharehold-
er Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1371-72 (1992) (observing that a
core base of long-term investors is vital to a corporation's implementation of a long-term
mandate); Williams & Conley, supra note 56, at 537 ("We suggest that the greater concen-
tration of longer-term investors in the [United Kingdoml is one factor that has led to more
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are miniscule without a change in the structure of the corporation to really
empower shareholders in return for their loyalty."1 3 For an investor, the
incentive that loyalty dividends present .has to match the opportunities
foregone both from financial and non-financial angles. If short-termists
feel more empowered by not tying themselves down to any particular
investment, and thereby giving themselves leverage with corporate
managers, an acceptable alternative would have to replace that sense or
reality of empowerment. Likewise, if the financial returns of high turnover
trading far surpass the benefit of a loyalty dividend, the dividend cannot
be an effective alternative. Perhaps, the economic allure of the dividends
may be further strengthened by making them tax-free, unlike regular
dividends.2 1 4 This approach would parallel the exclusion from dividend
attention being paid in that market to longer-term social and environmental risks."); see also
ALISON ATHERTON ET AL., INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES, SOLUTIONS TO SHORT-TERMISM IN
THE FINANCE SECTOR 14 (2007), available at http://www.isf.uts.edu.au/publications/atherton-
etal2007solutionstoshorttermism.pdf("[C]ompanies should seek out those investors who will
form a long-term shareholder base.").
213 LOWENSTEIN, supra note z6, at iz, 2o8-1o (stating that a "major hurdle is that the
shareholders have never had access to the nominating piocedures for directors or the proxy
machinery, except by a we-they confrontation that fund managers are understandably reluc-
tant to undertake" and arguing for shareholder power to nominate and elect a percentage of
directors that would be answerable to them). Recent legislative and regulatory changes have
provided a framework for shareholder access to the proxy machinery. See Press Release, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate Director Nominations by
Shareholders (Aug. 25, 201o), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2l10/2010-I55.htm.
For various reactions to the adoption of the proxy access regulations, see Stephen Bainbridge,
SEC Adopts Proxy Access, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Aug. 25, 2010, 1:39, PM), http://www.
professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/20 io/o8/sec-adopts-proxy-access.html;
Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Proxy Access Is In, HARv. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVER-
NANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 25, 2010,1 1:20 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2o Iolo8/25/
proxy-access-is-in/. The Conglomerate Blog organized a forum on proxy access that contains
divergent responses to the new regulations. See Erik Gerding, Proxy Access Forum: It's a Wrap,
CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 30, 201o) http://www.theconglomerate.org/forum-proxy-access/.
214 Currently, regular dividends are taxed at a rate of 15 percent. See I.R.C. § i(h)(C)
(West 2oi I). At times, the rate has been much higher than that, as dividends have previously
been treated as ordinary income for tax purposes. See Steven A. Bank, Dividends and Tax Policy
in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 537-38 (noting that before the change in 2003, indi-
vidual taxpayers paid taxes on dividends at a marginal rate that went as high as 38.6 percent
for highest income earners); James F. Loebl, QualifiedDividends: Do They AvoidDouble Taxation
orDo They Double Shareholders' Benefit?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1139, 1139 (2007) (stating that prior
to 2003 individuals reported their dividends as ordinary income and paid tax on the dividends
at their marginal tax rate; but legislation signed by President George W. Bush in 2003 and
2oo6 limited the top marginal tax rate on dividends received from domestic corporations to
fifteen percent); Note, Taxing Private Equity Carried Interest Using an Incentive Stock Option Anal-
ogy, 121 HARv. L. REV. 846, 864 (zoo8) ("Since 2003, individual taxpayers have paid the lower
long-term capital gains rate when they receive so-called 'qualified dividends,' a category that
includes dividends from domestic corporations."). The Obama Adminstration has retained the
Bush tax provisions under a compromise brokered in late 2010. See Sabrina Eaton, Breaking
Down the Tax Agreement, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 8, 20o, at A7.
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taxation that corporate entities who were shareholders in other corporations
enjoyed in the early twentieth century' s However, advocating for tax-
free treatment carries the burden of resorting to the public sphere for the
requisite regulatory intervention, thereby taking away one of the most
attractive features of the loyalty dividend. Finally, in view of the demerits
identified with the three proposals and the harm they could occasion, it may
be a more fruitful endeavor to focus on positioning management to resist
investor short-term pressure. In fact, the management side of the equation
may deserve more serious consideration. Part V outlines a pathway that
frees managers to manage for the long term.
V. LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT
A. Managing for the Long-term
One common ground shared by virtually everyone that is involved in
this debate is the need to preserve the existence of every corporation for as
long as possible. The problem is developing a plan that emphasizes long-
term performance, subordinating to it anything else to the contrary. One
commentator speaks for this consensus and the accompanying dilemma in
the following words:
The idea that management's primary responsibility is to
maximize long-term shareholder value is widely accepted in
principle but imperfectly implemented in practice. Maximizing
long-term value means that management's primary commitment
is to continuing shareholders rather than to day traders, momentum
investors, and other short-term-oriented market players. To
maximize value to continuing shareholders, managers must
develop and effectively execute strategies that maximize the
company's long-term cash flow potential. 16
One point that emanates from this observation is that short-termism
cannot be addressed by over-emphasizing investor contribution to the
problem. The management side of the equation, including the board
215 George Mundstock, Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends Under an Unintegrated Regime,
44 TAx L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1988) (stating that under a i9o9 Act, dividends that a corporation re-
ceived from another corporation were not subject to taxation).
216 Rappaport, supra note 6, at 69.
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of directors and senior officers of the corporation, deserves equal, if not
greater, attention.
B. Managerial Short-termism
While it may be true that managers sometimes respond to market
or investor short-term pressure, managers may also be independently
myopic. 17 Like investor short-termism, there has also been skepticism
about managerial short-termism fueled by the efficient capital market
hypothesis. 18 It did not take long, however, for the counter-contention
to develop with the effective demonstration that myopic behavior on the
part of corporate managers who care about stock prices was possible even
when the stock market is fully efficient 1 9 For instance, "managers might
rationally behave myopically as a result of a sort of prisoner's dilemma, in
which they are trapped in myopic behavior even if they know that the
market would be efficient in equilibrium."'2 0 Moreover, in expectation
of earlier exit or retirement from the company, managers may have little
motivation to pursue goals that have a maturity point in the distant future.2 1
Also, compensation through stocks and stock options could propel managers
to inflate or otherwise manipulate financial information to prop up stock
prices in the short-term for the benefit of the mangers who are ready to sell
or exercise the options.22 Interestingly, short horizon investors are likely
to support shorter vesting periods for stock options given to executives,
knowing that it could incentivize executives to adopt an outlook that is
favorable in the short-term and therefore beneficial to the short-termist
investors, even if unfavorable to the corporation in the long run. 2 3
Based on the foregoing, it is not surprising that scholarly attention
has also gravitated in the direction of managerial short-termism. Scholars
217 David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51
B.C. L. Rev. 435,441-42 (zoIo) (outlining reasons why managers would choose to be myopic).
218 See Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Cor-
porate Behavior, 104 Q. J. EcoN. 655, 655 (1989) (discussing one variant of the efficient capital
market argument: "since it is unlikely that the market can be systematically fooled by inflated
earnings, managers will only lower stockprices by undertaking actions that are not in the best
long-run interests of their companies; [therefore,] managers who are concerned with high
stock prices will not behave myopically") [hereinafter Stein, Myopic Corporate Behavior].
219 See id.
220 Walker, supra note 217, at 441; see Stein, Myopic Corporate Behavior supra note 218,
at 656-61.
221 Walker, supra note 217, at 457.
222 Umakanth Varottil, Evolution and Effectiveness of Independent Directors in Indian Corpo-
rate Governance, 6 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 281, 302 (20o).
223 See Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock -Salary and Options Too: The Looting of Corporate
America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419,447 (2010) ("A reckless corporate strategy, in the short term, may
increase the market price of a stock, which is what short-term institutional investors need to
cash out with a profit. Once out, they have no concern if the risky strategy later backfires and
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have, among others, proposed reform of executive compensation practices
and expansion of director fiduciary duties. As earlier noted, compensating
corporate managers through stocks and stock options may induce short-
term emphasis on their part.2 4 Proposals to reform executive pay proceeds
on the logic that ensuring that managers do not run their companies with
a short-term focus may require that equity-based compensation take the
form of restricted stock and longer holding periods for stocks and stock
options."5 Interestingly, the push toward compensating corporate managers
with equity started with the noble intention of reducing the agency costs
occasioned by the separation of ownership and control.116 The assumption
is that stock ownership or stock-based compensation aligns the interests of
managers and stockholders, thus propelling managers to act to maximize
shareholder value and corporate long-run growth." 7 Perhaps, in a classic
the stock price collapses. Thus, short-term institutional investors will not object to the imme-
diate vesting of stock options, a favorite compensation arrangement which encourages reck-
less corporate decisionmaking." (footnote omitted)); Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas 0. Edwards,
Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 159, 187 & nn.132-33 (2010).
224 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, PayingforLong-Term Performance, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1915, 1916-17 (2010); Patrick Bolton et al.,Executive Compensation andShort-Termist
Behaviour in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUn. 577, 579 (2006).
225 See Walker, supra note 217, at 455-56; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Response, The
Partner-Manager: Some Thoughts on Bebchuk and Fried, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 59, 64
(zio), http:l/www.pennumbra.comlresponses/response.php?rid=93 (questioning the adequa-
cy of restraints alone, without altering incentives, in addressing the problems occasioned by
the current structure of executive compensation).
226 But see Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance andMechanisms to Con-
trolAgency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J. FIN. & QUA rITATIVE ANALYSIS 377,
377 (1996) (stating that agency costs may be reduced through increased holding of shares by
managers); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 312 (1976) (stating that agency prob-
lems arise the moment the manager owns less than Ion percent of the corporation's stock).
227 See Jesse M. Fried, Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Execu-
tivePay, 89TEx. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (zoi) ("The Purpose of equity compensation is to better
align executives' interests with those of the firm's shareholders."); see also Jesse M. Fried &
Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 1010
(zoo6) ("[Elquity compensation aligns the interests of employees with those of sharehold-
ers."); David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Pledge (and Hedge) Allegiance to the Company, CLOSER
LOOK SERIES, Oct. 1I, 2010, CGRP-i I, at I, http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/researchldocu-
ments/CGRPi i-HedgingandPledging.pdf ("Companies include equity in a compensation
package to align the interests of management with those of shareholders. If the executive per-
forms well, both shareholders and the executive will profit; if the executive performs poorly, s/
he will suffer financially along with shareholders. In this way, equity compensation is expected
to encourage a focus on long-term value creation."); Francine J. Lipman, Incentive Stock Op-
tions and the Alternative Minimum Tax: The Worst of Times, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 337, 345 (2002)
(quoting the Congressional position that giving an option to the "management of a business to
have a proprietary interest in its successful operation [would] provide an important incentive
to expand and improve the profit position of the companies involved." (alteration in original)).
For a succinct exposition of this position, see Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Ef-
fect ofShareholderProposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1031 n.40 (1999).
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reflection of the law of unintended consequences, the opposite has become
the case."' The suggested antidote is longer vesting periods and greater
restrictions, including limits on ability of managers to hedge the risk of
equity-based compensation.2 19
Another approach focuses on expanding fiduciary duties to require
directors, outside the context of a takeover proposal, to act in the long-
term best interest of the corporation and its shareholders.13' According
to the proponent, this "proposal attempts to give effect to the long7
Thomas and Martin state the following:
[Tlhe conflict between managers and shareholders interests can be mitigated
through the use of incentive compensation packages which align the incentives of
managers with those of shareholders. Stock options can be used to provide manag-
ers with an equity interest in the corporation. As executives' level of stock owner-
ship increases, they will bear a greater percentage of the costs of any deviations
from the standard of profit maximization. In this situation, self-interest will lead
managers to act in shareholders' best interests.
Id. See generally Patricia M. Dechow & Richard G. Sloan, Executive Incentives and the Horizon
Problem: An Empirical Investigation, 14 J. AccT. & ECON. 51 (991) (analyzing CEO expendi-
tures in final years in office); Michael C Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-
Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (199o) (estimating CEO sensitivity to pay-perfor-
mance based on the ratio of the increase in CEO pay to the increase in shareholder wealth);
Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis,
7 J. AccT. & ECON. 11, 12 (1985) (analyzing "the relationship between firm performance and
managerial pay..." from empirical data).
z8 See Brian Cadman & Jayanthi. Sunder, Investor Myopia and CEO Horizon Incentives 6
(Working Paper, 2oo9), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractjid=9566oi
(noting that equity compensation tied to short-term stock returns would lead to investment in
short-term projects); see also Lipman, supra note 227, at 345 (discussing early skepticism about
the ability of stock options to align management-shareholder interests and improve corporate
profitability); James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder
Interests, 19 CARDozo L. REv. 697, 701-02 (1997) (raising doubts about whether compensation
through stock options accomplishes the objective of aligning management's interests with
the interests of shareholders). See generally Mycong-Hyeon Cho, Ownership Structure, Invest-
ment, and the Corporate Value: An Empirical Analysis, 47 J. FIN. ECON. IO3 (1998) (challenging
the notion that compensating executives through stock grants will have a positive effect on
investment decisions and consequently corporate value); Jeong-Bon Kim et al., CFOs versus
CEOs: Equity Incentives and Crashes, i o i J. FIN. ECON. 713 (2011) (demonstrating empirically
that option-based compensation can increase the risk of a stock price crash).
229 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing
and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359,361 (2009) (recommending exclusive
use of restricted stock as the form of equity-based compensation); Eli Ofek & David Yermack,
Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. FIN.
1367, 1369-70 (2o00) (discussing the practice of hedging the risk of equity-based compensa-
tion by managers); Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything
Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1045 46 (zoo9) (considering restricted stock as
severance pay); Steven C. Caywood, Note, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine
Can Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, Io9 MICH. L. REV.
III, I27-28 & n.107 (2010).
23o Nadelle Grossman, Turning a Short-Terma Fling into a Long-Term Commitment: Board
Duties in a New Era, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 905,905 (zoio).
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standing formulation of directors' fiduciary duties as being owed both to
the corporation as well as its stockholders, while also implementing the
policy of creating long-term profitability for the benefit of our economy
and society." ''
Efforts aimed at focusing managers on long-term management are
worthwhile. Nevertheless, there are legitimate questions that arise with
respect to favoring one group of shareholders over another or guaranteeing
that managers will not succumb to the wrong form of shareholder pressure.
Some of these questions may be resolved through a long-term shareholder
framework as a part of the corporate legal structure. Accordingly, this
article in Part VI below proposes a long-term shareholder primacy norm in
corporate law and stakes the case for it.
VI. LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY NORM
A number of policy reforms in response to the recent financial crisis,
including the 2008 & 2009 bailout legislation 32 and the 2010 Dodd-Frank
financial reform legislation, 33 proceed on the reasoning that the recent
financial crisis was precipitated by the short-term disposition of corporate
executives. 34 Accordingly, they contain provisions that limit managerial
incentives (such as executive compensation reform) or empower
shareholders (e.g. through proxy access) to constrain managerial ability
to tend to the short-term. 3 Critics argue that shareholder short-termism
is also a major problem and, therefore, empowering shareholders without
addressing their short-termist tendencies defeats the purpose of the latest
reform initiatives.2 36
Further, it is uncertain how expansion of director fiduciary duties to
prioritize the interest of long-term shareholders would operate without
231 Id. at 965. Professor Grossman's full proposal is as follows:
I propose that directors be required to make decisions primarily for the purpose
of advancing the long-term best interest of the corporation and its stockholders.
That means that every time the board is faced with a business decision, it would
need to consider how that would benefit the corporation and the stockholders in
the long-term, and make decisions that are aimed at achieving that objective...
. That would not mean that the board must shape corporate strategy such that a
corporation foregoes all opportunities to make current profits - but it would mean
that realizing on current profits could not undermine the corporation's ability to
generate profits in the future ....
Id. at 960.
232 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-61 (Supp. IV
2011); American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
233 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. ii-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
234 Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation ofOwnershipfrom Owner-
ship, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1823, 1839 (2011).
235 Idat 1839-40.
236 Id. at 1824-25.
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the recognition and internalization by corporations of a norm of long-term
shareholder primacy 37 For instance the proposal on reformulated fiduciary
duty to manage for the long term categorically states that "directors
could, in compliance with this duty, consider the interests of short-term
stockholders in making business decisions," but are not permitted "to
place those short-term interests above, or even on par with, the interests
of stockholders and other corporate constituents in sustained corporate
profitability."3 ' This formulation presupposes a norm to manage for the
long-term interests of stockholders (and the corporation); otherwise, it is
hard to find a legal justification for preferring one group of shareholders
(long-termists) over another (short-term oriented shareholders). 39 The
envisagednorm is the "long-term shareholder primacy norm" discussed in
greater detail below.
.A. The Case for Long-term Shareholder Primacy
This article proposes a long-term shareholder primacy norm that
is premised on the notion that managers should manage primarily and
principally for the benefit of stockholders, but that it is in the best interest
of the corporation, shareholders and other stakeholders for the corporation
237 See Matheson & Olson, supra note 212, at 1376-77 (proposing legislation that would
include a norm of long-term shareholder primacy).'
238 Grossman, supra note 23 o, at 96!.
239 See Grossman, supra note 23o , at 9o8 (advocating the imposition of a fiduciary duty on
directors to act in the long-term best interest of the corporation and its shareholders; adding
that "[w]hile some Delaware courts have expressed a preference for this type of long-term
standard, they have generally not required it"); Walton, supra note 66, at 12 ("[Tlhe role of
the corporation [is] to maximize the wealth of shareholders in the aggregate, rather than to
maximize the wealth of long-term shareholders only, a policy position embraced by [some
commentators] but one that is narrower than the current legal conception of the proper goal of
corporations."); see, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder
Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, (2oo6). But see Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (declaring that
"there is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally
strive to increase long-term shareholder value"); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Dela-
ware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521, 527 (2002)
(discussing directors duty to maximize long-term shareholder value). Some commentators go
further to reject the characterization of the corporation's goal as maximization of shareholder
interests, even in the aggregate. According to Fairfax,
The rhetoric, however, does not reflect this flexibility. Amazingly, most corporate
scholars continue to proclaim the dominance of the shareholder primacy theory
despite these erosions. They have done so even after courts and legislatures clearly
articulated increasingly stakeholder focused doctrines.
Less than five years ago, Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraak-
man proclaimed, "there is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corpo-
rate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value." This
proclamation in the face of an apparent shift in corporate law illuminates the un-
wavering nature of the shareholder primacy rhetoric in corporate legal discourse.
Id. at 690 (footnote omitted).
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to be run with a long-term perspective."4 The long-term shareholder
primacy norm will focus on length of holding, but will also address short-
termist tendencies even by those shareholders that have long holding
periods. 41 Shareholders will continue to enjoy almost unfettered freedom
to trade and maintain short holding periods, but their practices would no
longer drive or dictate corporate policy.
The norm integrates the insights of shareholder primacists and director
primacists who want the corporation managed with the maximization of
shareholder value at the forefront 42 and other board primacists who are
concerned that shareholder emphasis detracts from long-run growth
because of deference to short-term shareholders to the detriment of all. 4 3
The norm is also consistent with the argument, not necessarily based on
any form of shareholder primacy, that management's pursuit of a longer-
term strategy will benefit the shareholders and the corporation's other
constituencies, whose prosperity is tied to the long-term prosperity of
the enterprise's business operations."4 Managing the firm with a focus
on shareholder value maximization. in the long term will also address the
question posed by communitarians and stakeholder theorists because a
240 See Fairfax, supra note 239, at 702 ("[Plroponents of the long-term view of share-
holder primacy would contend that such a view accommodates non-shareholder issues. This
accommodation occurs because 'stakeholder' concerns, such as giving money to charity or
behaving responsibly towards employees and customers, inure to the benefit of shareholders
in the long-term." (footnote omitted)).
241 See Bohren, Priestley & 0degaard, supra note 3, at I n. I.
242 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 572 (2003) ("Director primacy does not deny that the proper
"end" of corporate governance is shareholder wealth maximization. Director primacy does
deny the logic of shareholder primacy - that the powers of the board of directors are delegat-
ed to the board by shareholders." (footnotes omitted)); Grant Hayden & Matthew T Bodie,
Shareholder Democracy andthe Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MAv L. REV. 207 1,
2o82-85 (2010) [hereinafter Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy] ("Scholars have referred
to the notion that corporations should seek primarily, if not solely, to maximize returns to
their shareholders as the shareholder primacy norm or the shareholder wealth maximization
norm. This norm is much more than a descriptive account of shareholders! rights; it is instead
a normative judgment on the most socially efficient way of organizing the economy. Propo-
nents of this norm argue that we will maximize our utility as a society only through a system
of corporate law that recognizes and perpetuates shareholder primacy." (footnotes omitted)).
243 LAWRENCE MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT 3
(2001) (stating that the way to accomplish a corporate long-term focus "is, paradoxically, to
free managers from the structural pressures of stockholders and capital markets .... "); John
Haberstroh, Activist Institutional Investors, Shareholder Primacy, and the HP-Compaq Merger, 24
HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & Po'y 65, 95 (2002) (discussing the contention that empowering institu-
tional investors is not the right approach to entrenching a long-term perspective in corpora-
tions); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 54, at 187-90 (decrying shareholder short-termism
and advancing quinquennial election of directors as a way of freeing managers from managing
for the short-term interests of shareholders); cf Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy, supra
note 242, at 2116 (analyzing the long-term theorists shareholder primacy norm).
244 Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 54, at 227-28.
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corporation that does well in the long run will better protect the interests of
all constituencies, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers
and communities.2 4
5
While the norm of long-term shareholder primacy may be mandated
by the courts and corporate statute, it may not necessarily take that
course.246 It may be accomplished through private ordering.2 47 A state
245 Jean Tirole provides a standard presentation of this question when he asks the fol-
lowing:
To many people the economists' and legal scholars'sole focus on shareholder value
appears incongruous. Managerial decisions do impact investors, but they also exert
externalities on a number of "natural stakeholders" who have an innate relation-
ship with the firm: employees, customers, suppliers, communities where the firm's
plants are located, potential pollutees, and so forth. There is no denying that such
externalities may be substantial; for example, the closure of a plant by a major
employer in a depressed area has dramatic consequences for its workers and for the
local economy. Why should institution design ignore the natural stakeholders, and
favor the investors, who are "stakeholders by design," by giving them full control
rights and by aligning managerial compensation with their interests?
Tirole, supra note 28, at 3. For a response that seems to confirm the view that the path to reso-
lution is through a focus on the long-term shareholder, see Julian Velasco, The Fundamental
Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407 (2006). The social responsibility theory,
according to Velasco,
[Mianaged to persuade most people - in theory, at least-that the long-term per-
spective is the appropriate benchmark. Thus, concern about conflicting interests
may be overstated; the conflict may not be as severe as often imagined and might
be resolved better by a long-term approach to shareholder interests than by a para-
digm of conflicting interests that need to be mediated.
Id. at 455. For the counter-argument that stakeholder interests cannot be adequately pro-
tected under the current corporate form, see Rakli I. Patel, Facilitating Stakeholder-Interest
Maximization: Accommodating Beneficial Corporations in the Model Business Corporation Act, 23 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 135 (2oO). Patel instead argues for protection of the interests of shareholders
and other stakeholders through a beneficial corporation. Id. at 137-39.
246 See Matheson & Olson, supra note 212, at 1376-77 (proposing legislation to enable
directors manage for the interest of the corporation and its long-term shareholders); see also
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of "Nexus of Con-
tracts" Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1135-37 (2o1i) (discussing the place of mandatory
terms in corporate governance).
247 Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J.
1405, 1431-32 (2000) (stating that "private ordering" is the economists' term for what sociolo-
gists refer to as social norms). For valuable discussions of the role of private ordering in cor-
porate law, see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response
to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. I (199o). Butler and Ribstein argue that "private
parties to the corporate contract should be free to order their affairs in whatever manner they
find appropriate." See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering andthe Proxy
Access Debate, 65 Bus. LAW. 329 (2010) (supporting shareholder ability to opt out of federal
proxy access regime); Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC's Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Eco-
nomics, andthe Law, 65 Bus. LAW. 361 (zoo) (arguing that implementing an opt-out approach
to proxy access would introduce the difficult problem of defining optimal proxy access default
rule); CHARLES M. NATHAN & PAUL F. KUKISH, CONFERENCE BOARD, PRIVATE ORDERING AND
PROXY ACCESS RULES: T"IE CASE FOR PROMPT ATTENTION (2oio), http://www.hedgerelations.
com/articles/TCB%zoDN.pdf (warning companies of the effect of the changes in the proxy
access rules).
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corporate statute may establish some standards or guidelines on long-
term shareholder primacy that corporations would be free to adopt., 8 The
statute may also impose such standards but allow corporations to opt-out
of the arrangement!"9 A pure form of private ordering may take the nature
of a voluntary effort undertaken by individual corporations that assumes a
stronger force as the practice becomes widespread."'0 The management of a
corporation may propose, at a general meeting of shareholders, the adoption
of the norm as the guiding framework for corporate policy and decision-
making. Shareholders may also initiate the effort through a shareholder
resolution that, if adopted by a significant majority of shareholders, signals
to the management the direction they want the company to take."'
Voluntary adoption and internalization of the norm may be a more effective
way of ensuring the entrenchment of long horizon management."2 Private
ordering will obviate unwanted wrangling among various interest groups.
Besides, internalization of norms ensures high levels of compliance with
those norms." 3 Conversely, when actors have not internalized a particular
norm, not even the law or the markets may succeed in constraining
248 The Matheson & Olson proposal provides a useful template that may be adapted
and adopted for this purpose. Matheson & Olson, supra note 2 I2, at 1376-77; see also Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1555 (1989) ("[W]
here important changes in the relationship between shareholders and management are at is-
sue, legislation that relaxes mandatory rules should always require an affirmative shareholder
decision to 'opt in' to the change rather than merely permitting shareholders to 'opt out."').
249 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who De-
cides?, 124 H/Asv. L. REV. 83, 102-04 (2010) (advocating a similar approach in the context of
decisions regarding corporate political speech).
250 See Christine Home, Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Norms, in SOCIAL
NORMS 3, 6 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds. 2001) ("Whatever the reason for the
initial action, when many people engage in the same behavior, that behavior comes to be as-
sociated with a sense of oughtness.").
251 For a comparative analysis of private ordering and a mandatory approach, see Strine,
Governance Question, supra note t6, at 21. Strine argues that "to be consistent with the private
ordering approach that has served to create so much wealth from the corporate form, stock-
holder input ... should proceed only if the stockholders of a particular corporation have de-
cided that such input is good for their specific corporation. Private ordering will avoid the costs
of an overbroad and rigid mandate, and allow the marketplace to innovate and develop ap-
proaches that, with experience, move toward the right balance." Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
252 See Brendan S. Maher, The Civil Judicial Subsidy, 85 IND. L.J. 1527, 1539 (2010) ("So-
ciety is lubricated by trust and internalized norms of conduct ....").
253 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE Dis-
PUTES 4-5 (1991) (arguing that social norms can displace state-made law); Robert Cooter, Do
GoodLaws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577,
1591 (2000) (stating that the effectiveness of laws is partly determined by the internalized
values of good citizens); Richard A. Falk, Book Review, 104 AM. J. INT'L L, 543, 547 (2oo) (re-
viewing INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS, (Anne Orford ed. 2oo6) (stating that high levels
of compliance with societal norms is a function of the internalization of those norms); LoPucki
& Weyrauch, supra note 247, at 1435 (arguing that social norms have greater effectiveness than
written laws).
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their behavior.'-' In addition, norms can eventually graduate into legal
stipulations."' 5 An aspirational norm, though not mandatory by definition,
can serve as a potent guide for reasonable and acceptable director decision-
making outcomes.
516
A strong case for the long-term shareholder primacy norm can be
made on the basis that long-term shareholders face greater vulnerabilities
than other shareholders and corporate constituents." 7 In addition, long-
term shareholder primacy better suits the rationale for shareholder
empowerment, namely that "shareholders, as the residual claimants, will
maximize long-term firm value because they are last in line at the time
of liquidation, and thus have strong reasons to guard against near term
collapse." ' Further justification emanates from the point that this idea is
favorable 5 9 or should be amenable to virtually everyone in the corporate
sphere, including the most ardent short-termist, who would need a general
investor understanding that today's share price reflects long-term value to
254 Melanie B. Leslie, Helping Nonprofits Police Themselves: What Trust Law Can Teach Us
About Conflicts of Interest, 85 CHi.-KENrr L. Rev. 551, 561 (2oo) ("[Wihen dominant directors
have not internalized those norms [regarding conflicted transactions], neither law nor markets
play a meaningful role in preventing self-interested behavior.").
255 Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1095, 1 lo6
(1986) ("Norms often precede laws but are then supported, maintained, and extended by
laws."); Iskra Uzunova, Note, Roma Integration in Europe: Why Minority Rights Are Failing, 27
Aaz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 283, 307 (2010) ("The interaction between legal and social norms is
complex: they are interdependent but may arise independently of each other and may affect
each other's formation."); Marc. T Moore, Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical
Foundations of Corporate Contractarianism 6-9 (Working Paper, 201 o), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/so03/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1706045 (discussing the role of private ordering in the
evolution of corporate law).
256 Jeffrey M. Cunningham, Boardroom Justice, NACD DIRECTORSHIP, Dec. 17, 2010,
http://www.directorship.com/boardroom-justice/. In an interview, Delaware Chancellor, Wil-
liam B. Chandler III, responded as follows:
What I was hoping to say in [the] Disney lease] is merely that it's highly unlikely
that they would ever be found liable if directors followed a path of best practices.
You could look at these best practices similar to a safe harbor provision. But best
practices in any endeavor constitutes an aspirational norm rather than a require-
ment, which hopefully will inspire as well as guide and inform directors in their
decision-making.
Id.
257 See Walton, supra note 66, at 1 I n. 5 (stating that one revelation from the recent fi-
nancial crisis was that while short-term investors and executives profited handsomely from
the housing bubble, long-term investors saw the evisceration of their investments); see also
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 314 (1999) (discussing shareholder vulnerability generally).
258 Rodrigues, supra note 234, at 1829.
259 Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 731 (2oo) (noting that "[d]
espite many parties' interests in short-term profits, long-term wealth maximization should
remain the goal of corporate governance" because it is in the interest of the various parties
involved in the corporate enterprise).
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be able to profitably engage in her investing style. 60 Indeed, indications
already abound that "the corporate rhetoric can be viewed as expressing
a normative preference for long-term shareholder primacy.21 61 The next
logical step is to back the "rhetoric" with action.
One way of backing the rhetoric with action will be the introduction
of a cadre of shareholders who enter into an enforceable commitment to
hold stock for an ascertainable, lengthy period of time.16 Moving in that
direction is likely to supplement and energize the norm. In the early 1990s,
Michael Porter made the case for addressing short-termism through certain
structural changes.163 Porter argued that a formula for discouraging short-
term trading and encouraging long-term holding is for corporations to
have the creation of long-term shareholder Value as their stated mission." 4
Firms would be encouraged to seek out long-term shareholders and accept
their role in governance. 65 The cadre of legally-committed long-term
shareholders will provide a practical application of this call.
B. Potential Objections to Long-term Shareholder Pimacy
Usha Rodrigues has identified some objections to privileging long-
term shareholders that are germane to this article's proposal.2 66 Opponents
26o Repetti, Tax Incentives, supra note 159, at 713-14; see also Black, Watching Agents, supra
note 24, at 863 ("[Elven an investor who plans to sell next month must care about long-term
value, because buyers will have a longer horizon."); Ira M. Millstein et al., Ten Thoughts For
Ordering Governance Relationships in 2010, in EIGHT ANNUAL DIRECTOR'S INSTITUTE ON CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE, at 341,344 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. 2010) ("Strong
corporate performance over the long-term benefits everyone - shareholders, boards, man-
agers, creditors, customers, suppliers, employees and the public. But some investors focus
instead on short-term stock price performance, which can lead to high-risk strategies that are
unsustainable and could encourage perverse incentives that put a company's future at risk.").
261 Fairfax, supra note 239, at 702.
262 I develop this idea more fully in a separate article that proposes the creation of a form
of relatively illiquid securities held by committed long-term shareholders under a revised
trust fund theory. See generally Emeka Duruigbo, Stimulating Long-Term Shareholding (Working
Paper, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1939502. Share-
holders that make such commitment would receive significant roles in corporate policy-set-
ting and decision-making. As one prominent board primacist has observed, notwithstanding
the fact that "shareholders may be able to liquidate their investments quickly, those who
choose to invest for the long-term are surely deserving of management consideration." Lip-
ton, Finance Corporatism, supra note 149, at 36. If long-term holders of shares that retain their
liquidity deserve such consideration, certainly a stronger case can be made for those that
voluntarily agree to make their shares illiquid for a given period of time. Duruigbo, supra, at
19-22.
263 See JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: How
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 161 (2000).
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Rodrigues, supra note 234, at 1825-26.
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may object to the proposal herein because it proceeds on the basis that we
still have long-term shareholders. On the contrary, there is a legitimate
question about the existence of long-term investors in today's investment
firmament. Some people that invest for the long-term may be properly
characterized as "short-term investors with long-term interests."'2 67
Achieving these investors' long-term goals does not necessarily preclude
short-horizon investing. In fact, such investors may prefer a series of
short-term investments that yield higher returns cumulatively than single
investments that are held for longer periods of time but generate lower
returns. If that is the case, focusing on the long-term investor's interest
clearly misses the point.216 Assuming, but not necessarily conceding, that
long-term investors are an extinct species, it is still important to note that
encouraging long-term investing is a worthwhile goal because it benefits
the society and economy to have firms that are run for the long-term.2 69
Long-term investors are more likely to enable long-term management.270
Thus, maintaining an environment in which such investors thrive is a
commendable goal.
Even if the existence of the long-term shareholder is accepted,
additional scholarly objection to a heightened protection of long-term
shareholders exists.271 The basis of this objection is that an efficient capital
market already provides sufficient protection for this type of shareholder
through a higher rate of return on the risk they assume in holding stocks
for a longer duration."2 However, this objection suffers from its assumption
that the market in which the long-term shareholder operates is totally
efficient.273 This assumption has been strongly disputed. 274 Instead, a
counter-contention can be made that "at least sometimes market prices
reflect short-term interests, rather than the long-term value of the firm,
and that the market does not fully price in systemic risk." ' In other
words, long-term investing exposes long-term shareholders to certain
vulnerabilities that place them in a unique position to warrant greater
267 Id. at 1826.
268 See id.
269 Id. ("It is in everyone's best interest for firms to be run for the long term. Stable firms
create stable employment, wealth, and goodwill that short-lived companies cannot provide.
The question our society faces is how to encourage long-lived firms when individual players,
including even long-horizoned investors, may be looking for a quick payoff.").
270 See, e.g., Summers & Summers, supra note 93, at 272-73 (advancing the argument
that encouraging long-term investment would in turn encourage long-term management);
Strine, Governance Question, supra note I6, at 8-9.
271 See Rodrigues, supra note 234, at 1825.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 1825-26.
274 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
275 Rodrigues, supra note 234, at 1826.
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protection. z7 6 As mentioned in the immediately preceding section, the
recent financial crisis presents a fitting illustration and telling confirmation
of this situation. While short-term investors profited handsomely, many
long-term investors were wiped out."'
One problem identified by opponents of shareholder empowerment
is that it may end up privileging one group of investors - short-term
investors who are more likely use the new powers - to the disadvantage of
the rest of the investor community."' A converse argument may be made
that this article's proposal confers a privilege on long-term investors as a
group to the detriment of short-term investors. This objection has some
merit. Indeed, a similar criticism has trailed the corporate reforms that
were included in the bailout package provided by the U.S. government to
certain corporations, beginning in 2008.279 The decision to give long-term
investors the edge is a conscious one premised on the conclusion that it
is in the best interests of all investors, the firm, economy, and society to
encourage long-term investing. Thus, the reasoning behind objecting to
privileging short-term investors, notably that such investors are about the
only ones that benefit to the injury of all other interests, is not applicable
to confining and consigning that privilege to long-term investors.,, On the
other hand, the case for long-term shareholder primacy is bolstered by the
absence of the dangers inherent in short-term shareholder empowerment
and the rationale for shareholder empowerment generally, which is that
276 See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
277 Id.
278 See Rodrigues, supra note 234, at 1829.
279 Rodrigues' response to this criticism is as follows:
The first [criticisml is that the bailout reforms are ill-advised because they seek
to maximize the long-term wealth of a corporation; according to some critics, any
shareholder-focuscd agency model should encourage management to maximize
the corporation's short-term stock price. This view, however, is in tension with
several principles of corporate law. The shareholder-wealth-maximization norm
gives managers a great deal of leeway in how they go about their maximizing, and
the pursuit of short-term price appreciation is clearly not required. It is true...
that short-term stock prices are more reliable today than in the past as a measure
of management's performance. But that observation is largely beside the point.
There is ample room in the shareholder-wealth-maximization norm to privilege
long-term over short-term wealth maximization, as the governmental response to
the bailout seeks to do.
Id. at 1846-47 (footnotes omitted).
28o Cf. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561,58 1-83 (2006); (discussing dangers of empowering short-term investors); Rodrigues,
supra note 234, at 1829 (stating that there are occasions "where the short-term gain comes at
the expense of the corporation over time"). But cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy
and Shareholder Disempowerment, 1 19 HpAv. L. REV. 1735, 1744-51 (zoo6) (explaining why lim-
ited voting rights of shareholders is the majoritarian default for corporation law).
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being residual claimants, shareholders are motivated to promote long-term
value.
Corporate law frowns upon the imposition of constraints on the
discretion of directors to manage the corporation as they deem fit. 8' One
of the admirable aspects of the shareholder-wealth-maximization norm is
that it "gives managers a great deal of leeway in how they go about their
maximizing" thus enabling them to favor long and short term interests
based on the circumstance.""2 A long-term shareholder primacy norm
impinges on this discretion and mandates managers to be devoted instead
to long-term shareholder-wealth-maximization. One response to this
criticism is that recent corporate developments suggest that managerial
freedom to emphasize both the long and short term as the need arises
has been severely curtailed by a besieging army of activist short-term
investors, who push managers to take actions with a near-term focus such
as selling a division or leveraging the firm to declare huge dividends to
the immediate benefit of the short-term investors and ultimate detriment
of the company.83 More importantly, a long-term shareholder primacy
norm is not adamantly opposed to short-term considerations, only those
considerations that would injure the health of the corporation. In such
situations, the management would be empowered to disregard such near-
term proposals, without risking any unsavory consequences from activist
short-termists.
CONCLUSION
Active short-term trading in stocks, as opposed to diligent long-term
investing, is once again a topical issue."z Short-termism is believed to
281 Restriction of director's discretion is, generally, occurs only in narrow circumstances.
E.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.zd 577, 581 (I11. 1964) (holding that invasion of the powers of
the directorate is acceptable in the "absence of an objecting minority interest, together with
the absence of public detriment"); Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641, 642 (N.Y. 1936) (holding
that a slight impingement on the discretion of directors is permissible, especially if no harm
is occasioned thereby); McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. Z34, 237 (N.Y. 1934) (holding that a
shareholder agreement that precludes the board of directors from changing officers, salaries,
or policies except by consent of the contracting parties is illegal); see also MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 8.oi (2007) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the
board of directors of the corporation .... ); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001) ("The business
and affairs of every corporation organizes under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors .... ").
282 Rodrigues, supra note 234, at 1847.
283 Id. at 1833-34; Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 64, at 1291-92 (discussing short-term
investor activism to the advantage of these shareholders and the detriment of the corporation
and its other constituents).
284 See Kelly & White, supra note 12, at 775 (stating that short-termism "is gaining
currency in business circles"); see also Carolyn Brancato & Michael Price, The Institutional
Investor's Goals for Corporate Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 44 (zooo)
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influence corporate policy because managers bow to perceived pressure
from transient investors. Moreover, shareholders are quick to dispose of
their stock, instead of staying and demanding change in corporate direction.
The result is a corporate world that is fixated on quarterly earnings
statements and not sufficient devotion to generating long-term value.
8 5
This article has examined the short term - long term debate and evaluated
three proposals advanced to address the short-termism question, namely
securities transaction tax, capital gains tax reform, and loyalty dividends. It
notes that their limitations propel a consideration of an alternative regime
that integrates managerial short-termism into the equation. It is imperative
to free, managers from both their independent myopia and shareholder
pressure that engenders managerial myopia through the adoption of a norm
of long term shareholder primacy. Under this norm, managers will perform
their functions with a primary focus on long-run growth of the corporation
and what is in the interest of long-term shareholders. Accordingly, they will
be able to use the legal shield provided by the norm to ignore the pressure
of those shareholders that are only concerned with short-term profit.
Some remarkable reactions to the Enron debacle and the recent
global financial crisis locate the cause and solution to the problem in
the shareholder. Short-term oriented shareholders are believed to have
driven corporate managers to decisions that led to the catastrophes.116 Yet,
some scholars also attribute the problem to a lack of shareholder power. 87
Although both responses are disputed, 8 s one can find some grain of truth
in each of them. This work has extensively discussed the influence a short-
term investor orientation can have on managers. Overcoming managerial
myopia may require shareholder empowerment. However, the focus of
this empowerment should be on shareholders that clearly demonstrate a
long-term orientation. This article has argued that a long-term shareholder
primacy norm will provide this sort of empowerment. The long-term
shareholder primacy norm would provide a framework within which to
address difficult questions relating to the appropriate management of
the corporation to the benefit of its constituents. While this norm may be
("No issue continues to polarize corporations and institutional investors more than 'short-
termism' - the notion that institutional investors are only speculators or traders ... .
285 See David Millon, Why is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and
What Should Be DoneAbout It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 890, 890 (2002) ("What is lost is a more
patient approach to management emphasizing the long-term well being of the corporation and
all its stakeholders. Sacrificed are potentially more lucrative payoffs that require immediate
expenditures but yield their fruits only over the long haul.").
286 Hill, Unpredictable Shareholder, supra note 8 1, at 10 12-14.
287 Id. at IOlz.
288 Id. at tOl2-14.
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initiated by legislative action or judicial fiat, it may also evolve through
private ordering.
